THE Nation

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# Lift the Ban!

SINCE last week when the Board of Education ratified the exclusion of *The Nation* from the New York schools, a number of important citizens organizations and professional groups have united to fight the ban. Our case has, in effect, been taken over by the people. At a meeting held on Wednesday, June 30, it was unanimously decided to constitute an *ad hoc* committee of individuals and organizations prepared to fight the case through to an eventual reversal. Those present promised to rally other groups with which they were in contact and to obtain the formal indorsement of their own organizations, where this was still lacking, for the objectives of the committee.

A subcommittee appointed to coordinate and plan the campaign met next day. This group is already at work, setting up the actual organization of the *ad hoc* committee and launching immediate moves to restore *The Nation* to the list of approved publications.

The protests and offers of cooperation that have poured into this office have been impressive in both number and character. The action of the school boards was so flagrant that our case has been instantly recognized and seized upon as an ideal basis for a drive to reform the entire system of choosing and censoring books and periodicals. Many liberal leaders have defied the tacit taboo against any cause frowned upon by the Catholic church, and challenged directly the decision of the education authorities. *The Nation,* on its own behalf, has called upon the Board of Superintendents and the Board of Education to provide a public hearing at which this journal and its supporters can present arguments for a reversal.

A similar demand has been made by a group of organizations whose boards have already authorized action. These are the American Civil Liberties Union, the Council Against Intolerance, the Teachers' Union, the New York Teachers' Guild, the American Jewish Congress, and the Lawyers' Guild.

The *ad hoc* committee will be headed by Archibald MacLeish, poet, member of UNESCO, former Librarian of Congress, who although on vacation in Massachusetts immediately offered his services to *The Nation.* Mr. MacLeish has sent to Dr. Maximilian Moss, acting president of the Board of Education, and Dr. William Jansen, Superintendent of Schools, a message which, better than anything that has been said, sums up the case of free-minded men and women against the exclusion of *The Nation* and against all like acts of intolerance and censorship:

## A Dangerous Challenge

The ban on *The Nation* is not only the most arrogant and contemptuous of the recent challenges to the American principle of freedom of mind and freedom of expression; it is also the most dangerous. It threatens not only the liberal press but the whole press, and not only the whole press but the educational system of the country and even its library system. There is not an American who believes in the American conception of a free mind in a free society who can sit back in silence in the face of the cynical impudence of this attack. What it means is simply this: that any pressure group with sufficient political power, wishing to silence criticism of its action, can do so by suppressing that criticism in the schools or on the shelves of public libraries. The pretext that Blanshard's articles were an attack on religion is palpable nonsense unless "religion" is to be understood to mean whatever a church does, whether in international politics or in national politics or in a city's schools or its hospitals or its newspapers or its tax system, or even the most intimate and least institutional aspects of the lives of its families. If "religion," contrary to the whole sense and meaning of American life, is understood to cover all this, then the fundamental separation of church and state on which our liberties rest—above all, the greatest of our liberties, that of conscience and belief—is no separation at all. For thus any worldly church or any worldly body calling itself a church may take power as it pleases without fear of criticism of its purposes or acts.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

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# *The Shape of Things*

THE FLARE-UP OF EISENHOWER SENTIMENT at the eleventh hour before the Democratic convention lost none of its significance when the General finally extinguished it. To some of the party leaders who leaped aboard the bandwagon, he was perhaps the ideal nominee, loved for himself alone; but to many more, his name was simply the rallying cry for those who see no future for the Democratic Party under Harry Truman. There is good reason to believe that to many top Southern politicians the civil-rights program was merely a handy pretext for abandoning a President who could not win; and it is not to be imagined that such last-minute Eisenhower converts as Jersey's Boss Hague were concerned with the General's qualifications or beliefs so much as with the hopelessness of the Truman candidacy. In the light of these circumstances, the Eisenhower strength is clearly transferable—to William O. Douglas, we hope, but in fact to almost anyone *but* the President. A reverse shift would seem psychologically out of the question. Until last week, Chairman McGrath could point out the impossibility of the party's repudiating its own President. But the fact is, he has already been repudiated. The call for the anti-Truman caucus was signed by the most representative group of Democratic leaders to be found outside the convention itself, including Northern city bosses, Southern bourbons, Southern moderates like Senators Hill and Sparkman, and such New Dealers as James Roosevelt, Mayor O'Dwyer of New York, Mayor Humphrey of Minneapolis, Leon Henderson, and Chester Bowles. Having gone this far in order to forestall a Truman nomination, these rebels, representing every aspect of the coalition that kept Roosevelt in power, cannot turn back and proclaim the incumbent the hope of the nation. What has already happened makes it more than ever imperative for Mr. Truman to step aside, as we urge elsewhere in these pages, unless he is ready to make a shambles of the Democratic Party.

*

COUNT BERNADOTTE'S SUGGESTED PEACE terms for Palestine leaked before they were published and were rejected before they were officially acted upon. Though heavily weighted on the side of the Arabs, they assumed the continued existence of an independent Jewish state; and this alone was enough to insure the opposition of all the Arab leaders and the Arab League itself. As for the Jews, they could never accept proposals under which Israel would lose part or all of the Negev, control of the port of Haifa, and full authority over immigration within its own boundaries. Nor could they agree to the astonishing suggestion to include Jerusalem in Arab territory, even with "autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the holy places," or to an imposed "coordination" of foreign policy with the Kingdom of Transjordan. Some territorial changes might be accepted by Israel as the result of negotiations: the Negev is essential to long-range plans of immigration and settlement, but some part of it might be exchanged for western Galilee. What the Jews cannot admit is infringement of their right to negotiate such matters as a sovereign state. But behind all these reasonable objections is the more fundamental fact that the U. N. mediator's proposals reflected, almost point by point, the British plan to retain many of its old prerogatives in Palestine while relinquishing formal control. That plan, backed by the Henderson clique in the State Department, includes recognition of Abdullah as king of an enlarged state to include the Arab areas of Palestine, the ceding of Jerusalem and the Negev to Abdullah, port rights for Abdullah at Haifa—all of these, of course, to come under the de facto control of the nation that controls Abdullah and his Transjordan kingdom, that is, Great Britain. These points Bernadotte has incorporated almost unaltered in his suggested peace proposals. Obviously, they could not be accepted by a sovereign state of Israel that hopes for eventual freedom of action in its own area.

*

THE CRISIS IN BERLIN SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN a turn for the worse with the presentation of notes from Britain, France, and the United States to Moscow protesting against the Russian blockade. The fact that, after several days and numerous consultations, three notes were sent instead of one reflects the differences among the Western allies as to the proper policy to follow. We still believe it is most unfortunate that France has lost its natural role of mediator, and even more so that the Berlin crisis finds the two blocs facing each other without any other force in a position to intervene. Had it not been the policy of the great powers to reduce the initiative of the United Nations, this would be the moment for Trygve Lie to offer its good offices. But an appeal of the Berlin Municipal Council to the Danish government asking that it request the intervention of the United Nations was turned down in Copenhagen as condemned in advance to futility. Consequently, we see the Western Allies and Russia heading toward a situation in which agreement will become more difficult with the dispatch of each "more serious" note, and retreat more painful as prestige and honor become involved in the controversy. The best hope is that once the dispute has been taken out of the hands of the military commanders, the governments may decide that if the German problem is ever to be solved by peaceful means it had better be done before disintegration has gone so far that even the will to repair the damage will have disappeared.

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VIEWED IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORM, THE FIVE points of the recent Warsaw manifesto offer little ground for a rapprochement. They reflect the Soviet conception of a government for all Germany that has met with such strong opposition in the past; and they provide for the inclusion of Russia in the control of the Ruhr, which the Allies consider unjustified as long as the Russians reject Allied participation in the economic control of their zone. But with all its insistence on impossible conditions, the demand that present difficulties in Germany be laid before a new meeting of the four Foreign Ministers has an irresistible appeal in a Europe that believes every measure should be taken to avoid an irreparable conflict between West and East. Of course, a necessary prelude to a new conference would be the lifting of the Berlin blockade and the adoption of a plan of discussion designed to prevent a repetition of the failures at Moscow and London. We firmly believe that the western nations should follow up their protest with immediate concrete proposals looking toward such a meeting.

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IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR E. R. P. AID, EACH recipient nation must sign an agreement with the United States declaring adherence to fiscal and monetary policies regarded in Washington as sound. There has been some delay in arriving at the final agreements with France and Britain, since these nations did not wish to accept conditions which might tie their hands in case the most optimistic expectations were not realized. To require that a government balance its budget, maintain a sound currency, and stabilize its exchange is all very well in the case of a nation which has become involved in reckless budgetary practices and must take drastic measures to avoid recurring crises of price inflation. But in Britain especially, where there is now a budget surplus and prices are better controlled than in the United States, there has been a marked reluctance to accept any provision that might be interpreted as an American veto on the future right of the British to carry on planning and monetary management in the interest of full employment, if and when the present world-wide boom is succeeded by depression.

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THE FINAL AGREEMENT, ACCORDING TO SIR Stafford Cripps, does not bind Britain to do anything that it did not expect to do anyway. Instead of undertaking an obligation, it has merely declared an intention —which in diplomatic language is much less solemn. Though Britain accepts the principle of the balanced budget, this is interpreted to mean a budget balanced over a period of years and not in each single year; the way is therefore left open for a compensating fiscal policy. At present, the compensating policy requires what now exists—not only the absence of a deficit but a sub-

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stantial surplus, since prices are high and there is a labor shortage. Nobody has ever seriously accused the British of wanting to undermine their currency. As for the exchange value of the pound, the British have feared that we wanted to force them to devalue it at a time when devaluation would exaggerate their difficulty in earning enough dollars. The proper time for devaluation may come when export markets will no longer absorb all the goods the British can spare, and when the prices of food and raw materials bought abroad are not so high as at present. For devaluation reduces the price of exports and raises the price of imports, in the currency of the devaluing nation. Fortunately, the clause governing this matter is general enough so that it does not confine a flexible policy by rigid dogma.

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WHATEVER THE MERITS OF WALLACE'S NEW party, there is no moral justification for preventing his name from appearing on any ballot. Yet two states so far have crudely tried to do just that. The Secretary of State of Oklahoma invoked the technicality that the party had not yet adopted its platform and thus could not be listed. The state's Supreme Court last week, by a six to one vote, rejected the appeal from this decision made in Wallace's behalf by the Progressive Party of Oklahoma, and the party is now preparing to carry the case to the United States Supreme Court. The tactics of Edward J. Hummel, Secretary of State of Ohio, were even more heavy-handed. He blandly announced on June 4 that the third party was barred from the 1948 Presidential ballot in his state because five of the ten members of the Ohio Wallace-for-President Committee are "Communists" or "fellow-travelers." A 1941 Ohio law, Hummel pointed out, forbids subversive groups from appearing on the ballot. This decision, of course, was also brought to the courts by the Wallace adherents, and briefs in the case will be filed in the Ohio Supreme Court at the end of this week. Both the Ohio court and the United States Supreme Court will, we trust, state the obvious: that the Wallace followers cannot be branded "subversive" on the say-so of a state official or hamstrung by a network of legal gimmicks. The Communist Party itself has not been declared illegal, and it has in its own name repeatedly appeared on the Presidential ballot. The only subversion consists in these devious attempts to suppress any party that represents a threat to one of the established Big Two.

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THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE threatened railway strike having run out, the government has now obtained a permanent one. Apparently, it had to do so because in the interim it has been unable to bring about an agreement between the managements and the three brotherhoods which threatened to strike. What next? There seems to be little to prevent the present anomalous situation from running on forever. Legally, the army is operating the railroads; actually, the private managements are doing so. The managements and the unions cannot agree; meanwhile, the men have to continue to work on the terms of the expired contract because they would be subject to heavy penalties if they walked out. No one of the parties concerned seems able to bring any effectual pressure on any of the others—unless, in the end, the unions give up hope of obtaining anything more than the managements now offer. Perhaps it would have been better if the President had said, "I will take over the railways if I am compelled to do so to prevent a strike, but if I do so I will not turn them back. The army will operate them, setting up its own management, until Congress determines how the railroads shall be owned and managed." Faced with such an ultimatum, both sides might have taken less lightly the prospect of government intervention.

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IF AMERICAN POLICY ON INDONESIA HAS shifted toward the Australian point of view, as Andrew Roth indicates in his dispatch from Batavia on page 39, it is extremely heartening. For this would mean that the State Department has finally concluded that our long-held pro-Dutch policy has been productive of neither peace nor prosperity in the rich, troubled islands. The Australians had always insisted that the republic must be dealt with as the ultimate victor in this struggle, and that an effort to achieve a fair settlement would be profitable in assuring a friendly government in Jokjakarta. But it remains to be seen whether or not the American representative on the Good Offices Committee in Indonesia has the full backing of Washington in his cooperation with the Australians. For the committee is completely frustrated at this point, its further deliberations blocked by the rule of unanimity under which Belgium, spokesman for Holland, has refused to allow publication of the plan proposed by Australia and the United States. Despite its seeming change of heart, the State Department has refused to end the deadlock, which it might have done either by supporting the appointment of a United Nations mediator with broad powers or by initiating a change in the rules of procedure governing the Good Offices Committee. Instead, our delegate to the Security Council abstained from casting the single vote needed to make public the still secret compromise formula which aroused Mr. Roth's high hopes, and which has now been interred by Belgium's veto. In this rare instance where the material interest of the United States coincides with the just solution of a pressing problem, it would seem that our State Department should have no trouble in making up its mind.

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# Tito and the Kremlin

FOR more than a week, the drama in Eastern Europe has held the world spellbound. Each act has added to the suspense, offering little clue to the outcome. After the first—the Cominform's denunciation of the Yugoslav Communist Party and of Tito's alleged deviations from Stalinist theory—most observers expected quick submission or a quick purge. The second act was a breathtaking surprise. Tito defied the Cominform, rebutted the ideological attack on his rule, called for an increase in the army, and proposed the early creation of a Balkan union among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania—the very idea the Kremlin had rejected last summer. The third act showed the Soviet satellites lining up behind their leader; one by one, they denounced the heresy of Belgrade. But they tried to keep their relations as states free from the effects of the ideological-party showdown. Only Albania fouled its lines, answering an attack by Tito's government by breaking trade relations and calling home its trade and cultural missions. So far, neither Bulgaria nor Albania has replied to the Yugoslavs' embarrassing offer of union. It may be supposed that they are waiting to see which way the Kremlin cat jumps in the next few days.

On page 47, Mr. del Vayo interprets the whole row as evidence of an impending change in Moscow's political relations with the other Communist parties and with the left throughout Europe rather than as a break in the eastern front. Surely, he is right to warn the West against expecting an easy or early collapse of the Russian bloc. But it would be equally dangerous to ignore the fact that Communist differences—in Moscow and in the international organization—have usually been reflected in Russia's foreign policy. "Popular-frontism" was a phase that coincided with the effort to create an anti-fascist bloc with the Western nations—an effort scotched in Spain and killed at Munich. Communist attacks on the "imperialist" governments of the West between 1939 and 1941 and Communist support of the same governments between 1941 and 1945 alike represented the contrary interests of the Soviet Union in each period.

The clash between Tito and the Kremlin apparently reveals the dominance of the most extreme elements in the Politburo and foretells a prospective crack-down on deviations or signs of independence anywhere. But it also implies, we believe, a tough determination on the part of Russia to seal the Eastern bloc against the permeation of Western influence. If this is so, the climax of the drama will be the collapse of Tito's defiance or the rise to power of other more amenable elements. The alternative, Russian acquiescence in what amounts to a rebellion against its rule, is hardly worth discussing as a possible dénouement.

# Truman's Big Chance

HARRY S. TRUMAN is a man who trusts to luck—and with good reason. Only fourteen years ago, when Franklin D. Roosevelt was already half through his first term, Truman at the age of fifty was still an obscure county judge in Missouri. In that year, when his immediate predecessor in the Presidency was remodeling the social structure of the country, Mr. Truman went, hat in hand, to Tom Pendergast to ask shyly for the job of Collector of Internal Revenue. As a very minor judge—the kind that needed no knowledge of the law—he had performed faithfully at the rate of $6,300 a year, and the collector's post represented the known peak of his ambition. But, the story goes, the notorious Missouri boss winked slyly and said, "The best I can do right now, Harry, is a United States Senatorship."

That was the beginning of the Truman miracle. Six years later, his friend Pendergast in jail and the machine in ruins, the still obscure Senator ran again. After a three-cornered fight for the nomination, he squeaked in by a margin of 7,000 in a total vote of 1,500,000. And in 1944 came the greatest stroke of all. In a fierce intra-party row over the Vice-Presidency, the bolt of fortune once more fell on the man from Missouri. With Roosevelt's half-hearted blessing—he had actually indicated a preference for William O. Douglas—the convention hit on Harry as a man who would antagonize none of the warring factions, even though he might make no contribution whatever to the success of the ticket.

It was no wonder, then, that on a fateful day in April, 1945, Harry Truman murmured to the press, "Boys, if you ever pray, pray for me now." No one knew better than he how little equipment he brought to the Presidency, and in those early days in the White House his humility was obvious and genuine.

Three short years in office have worked a sad change in Mr. Truman. Somehow he has stumbled through, his mistakes have not brought the nation to dust, and he has come to enjoy the taste of authority. Where he once was rightly overwhelmed at the thought of himself in the seat of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, he now stubbornly, even high-handedly, insists on a renewal of power, as though it were his by right. He has not bothered to conceal his disdain for those who want an open convention at Philadelphia; repeatedly and doggedly he has informed the country that he will not only be nominated in July but elected in November. And the worst of it is that he believes it.

He must believe it, just as he must believe that he is a good President. For Harry Truman is too honest and too humane a man to force his candidacy in this way if he thought it would harm his country or his party. Yet it will harm both—and the world as well.

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It will harm his party, perhaps irreparably, because it all but begs for the most smashing defeat the Democrats have suffered since 1920. Nobody but the sycophants with whom he has surrounded himself and the professional politicians of the National Committee concede him a chance of victory.

The country will be harmed because Mr. Truman is not only insuring a Republican Administration but the election of an Eighty-first Congress worse than the Eightieth. Regardless of the heads of their ticket, the G. O. P. can with almost complete immunity dredge up its Tabers and Hallecks, knowing that an opposition led by Truman and badly weakened by competing Wallaceites will be no opposition at all. Obviously, there is a point at which the magnitude of Republican victory will prevent the Democrats from even providing an effective opposition. All of which is the more ironic in that the Democrats need only four additional seats to regain control of the Senate.

What is true of the effects on domestic policy of such a débâcle as the Truman candidacy would assure is equally true in the field of foreign relations. Whatever may be said for the triumph of Republican internationalism at Philadelphia last month, the G. O. P. is deeply divided on this critical question. While Taft and Martin were defeated at the convention, so were Stassen and Vandenberg. Dewey, the cautious middle-man, is ranked with the internationalists, but he is also a budget-worshiper. In any case, it is not easy to imagine him far in front of a reactionary Congress armed with a fresh "mandate from the people," even though that mandate may in reality be nothing more than a reflection of Mr. Truman's weakness plus a diversion of Democratic votes to Henry Wallace.

Viewing these circumstances from all possible angles, we are driven to join with those who call upon the President to renounce his candidacy. Often as we have disagreed with him, we have not questioned either his goodwill or his personal courage, but on both counts he will be judged historically by what he does between now and July 12, when his party meets in convention. His repeated insistence that he be nominated would be instantly forgotten in the general rejoicing of his party colleagues should he now take himself out of the race. The test of Harry Truman is not his willingness or unwillingness to "run from a fight," as he expresses it; the test is whether or not he is big enough to forgo a cheap victory at Philadelphia for the sake of the common good.

# *Douglas: The Best Hope*

BY JAMES A. WECHSLER

*Washington, July 5*

ONE week before the Democratic convention the odds remain high that President Truman will compel his party to sign a suicide pact with him at Philadelphia. Whatever vitality still exists in the Democratic camp is sustained by the final, feverish effort to awaken Mr. Truman's nostalgia for Missouri or remove him forcibly from the Presidential campaign.

Ultimately it may be said that General Eisenhower insured the nomination of Mr. Truman, and the election of Governor Dewey, by prolonging the uncertainty about his own plans long enough to prevent a unified offensive in behalf of Justice William O. Douglas, but it is now contended in some quarters that the anti-Truman insurgence could not have reached its pre-convention dimensions without the free use of Eisenhower's name. Whatever the outcome, the survival of the Douglas boom is in many ways a more fascinating phenomenon than the persistence of Eisenhower's. Douglas has never led an army. He has not held any elective office since his undergraduate days. For nine years he has lived in the comparative isolation of the Supreme Court. A small circle of "Douglas boys"—similar to the "Frankfurter boys" and other Washington fraternities—has remained ardently devoted to him, but it would be an absurd exaggeration of their prowess to suggest that their valiant murmurings alone have kept Douglas politically alive. The important fact is that in this summer of Democratic despair Douglas has received popular notice second only to Eisenhower in the quest for a replacement for Mr. Truman.

Nor is the Douglas drive the belated product of journalistic dog days and Washington whispers. When I was covering Henry Wallace's campaign during the first five months of this year I repeatedly found evidence that Douglas was the only New Deal figure, with the exception of Mrs. Roosevelt, who commands the allegiance of non-Communist liberals hovering around the Wallace camp. His popularity was especially pronounced on college campuses, where Douglas-for-President clubs had mushroomed without any semblance of high-pres-

*JAMES A. WECHSLER, formerly on the staff of* The Nation *and now Washington correspondent for the New York* Post, *is unusually well qualified to write on the candidacy of Justice Douglas. A close observer of political trends during the past decade, he has written extensively on all major political figures of this period.*

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sure organization. All this might be interesting but not very significant except for the curious affection for him displayed by many Democratic political leaders. Men who like to be described as practical politicians are genuinely fond of him, though they seldom feel this emotion for members of the intellectual professions. Frequently in recent months they have wept in their beers over Bob Hannegan's 1944 palace coup which juggled the names of Mr. Roosevelt's favorite running-mates and gave Harry S. Truman precedence over Douglas.

There is no statistical proof that Douglas could defeat the Dewey-Warren ticket. As a matter of fact, the G. O. P. combination, it is felt here, would have given Eisenhower a close race had he decided to run. But Douglas would impart real fighting quality to a Democratic campaign that will touch new depths of apathy if Mr. Truman is the standard-bearer. Douglas would unquestionably cut heavily into the Wallace vote in the big cities where third-party Congressional candidates now threaten to render extinct the vanishing tribe of liberal legislators. It is at least conceivable that Douglas's leadership of the Democratic ticket would finally persuade Wallace to retire, despite his vigorous denials of such a possibility. Wallace's recent wrangles with the Communists in his own party and the difficulty of rationalizing an all-out attack on Douglas cannot be entirely discounted, although Wallace's emotional commitment to the third-party crusade is obviously intense.

These are some of the immediate reasons why the Democratic leaders, even while they looked wistfully toward Morningside Heights, nevertheless kept talking about Douglas. In the longer run Douglas's continued grip on political imaginations probably stems from the quality which he shared most conspicuously with Franklin D. Roosevelt—an authentic idealism combined with an instinctive sense of the time to take action. In election years, at least, liberals welcome some signs of political talent in their leaders, and politicians are impressed by the uses of communicable idealism.

DOUGLAS'S name first appeared prominently on the political form-charts in 1939 when he was considered a possible successor to or running-mate for Roosevelt. His generalship of the SEC's climactic battle with Wall Street had attracted wide attention. He was tough, resourceful, and courageous at a time when the New Deal's domestic retreat had begun and the liberals were showing weariness. In retrospect he has been occasionally criticized for cold tenacity and disingenuousness at some stages of the battle. Without exploring the details of these arguments, it is worth noting that every important New Deal figure has evoked a group of detractors.

Douglas was the youngest man to be appointed to the Supreme Court in more than a century. In 1944 he might have secured the vice-presidential nomination despite Hannegan's maneuvers if he had pressed for it. He nearly left the court to take a key post in the war-production setup; during the Truman regime he was invited to become Secretary of the Interior. It is unquestionably true—and perhaps this is the most critical observation that can be made about him—that Douglas has shown an infinitely greater capacity for decisiveness in his work and in his judgments than in resolving his own future. In part this probably reflects the swiftness of his rise. He will not be fifty until October and neither he nor his friends have ever felt as if time were running out on him. It is probably only in the last few weeks that some of them have begun to wonder whether destiny's cards are stacked against him. One of his most devoted adherents, who happens to be extremely realistic and astute in most matters, said privately a few days ago: "I've just always assumed that Bill Douglas lived under a lucky star, that some day he would be President of the United States and we would then be able to say that we knew all along it was going to happen. But now I'm not so sure we can depend on the star."

This man was expressing the view that a Dewey-Warren landslide in November is unlikely to be a temporary triumph. Under Truman the Democrats face a defeat comparable to the Republican débâcle of 1932. In the ensuing Democratic disintegration Dewey will move his powerful machine to Washington. Barring an economic disaster such as *Pravda* economists forecast, the Democratic revival may be indefinitely postponed. It is also acknowledged that in the face of a threatened collapse Dewey, unfettered by Bob Taft's genuine devotion to Republican economic principles, might even call on Dr. New Deal for help.

This may be getting ahead of the story, but it has cru-

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cial bearing on Douglas's future. The prospect has visibly altered the thinking of some of the "Douglas-in-'52" strategists who have heretofore counseled maximum caution. With a Taft or Bricker in the White House after a losing race by Mr. Truman, another four-year wait for Douglas made sense. Now that this possibility has been dispelled, the case for a full-fledged fight in Douglas's behalf has naturally become a good deal stronger. The chance of its success is of course slight. But the liberal-labor bloc in the Democratic Party would at least have established its identity. In any subsequent realignment Douglas might well emerge in a leading position. The alternative at this moment seems to be curtains for the Democratic Party and a long interval of confusion in the liberal-labor camp.

Through all this speculation Douglas has remained in seclusion in Oregon. The awkwardness of his position is apparent, and whatever the outcome he is certain to be relieved when the convention adjourns. Some of his colleagues on the court and a number of craft-conscious lawyers have regretted the use of his name in a vulgar political context. Douglas is deeply sensitive to the dilemma. Although he enjoys talking with correspondents and other emissaries from the outside world, his own name is always excluded from the conversation. Any resemblance between Justice Douglas and William O. Douglas must be considered coincidental. In lawyers' caucuses it is often remarked that "Bill Douglas would make a better President than a judge"; whether this comment is prejudiced may be open to dispute. In any event the suggestion has been frequently made that he must finally choose between the court and public office. A newspaperman enters this craft controversy at the risk of his life. One cannot, however, escape the melancholy overtones of the argument. For at a time when liberalism is fighting a defensive action, these murmurs—and Douglas's response to them—may have made it impossible for him to wage a successful fight for the nomination. It is even conceivable that pressure or protocol may compel him to withdraw before the convention opens.

WITHOUT prying into the soul of a Supreme Court judge, it is difficult to believe that Douglas is unaware of the drama in which he is the central character. Prominent as he has been in the political speculation of the last decade, there is little intimate knowledge about the man. Liberals who have experienced the disenchantment of the Wallace episode are fearful of creating a new "legend," and the Douglas build-up has been remarkably devoid of sentimentality. Actually Douglas's career and personality are full of paradoxes. On first meeting he seems extremely diffident and distant; yet within half an hour, as many reporters have noted, there is a temptation to call him Bill, and conversation becomes frank and lively.

His missionary father died when he was six, and Douglas had a rough time as a youth. He finally worked his way through Columbia Law School and entered a prosperous Wall Street law firm, but he quit after a year and took up teaching. While he has been repeatedly put forward as the liberals' choice, his progressivism is far more deeply related to the indigenous, pragmatic, anti-big-business tradition represented in one sphere by Justice Brandeis and in another by the La Follettes than to the Marxist maneuvers of the 1930's. His speeches and writings reflect a vastly more sophisticated grasp of current left-wing affairs than Wallace has exhibited; his friendships are diverse, ranging from Walter Reuther to middle-of-the-road Congressional figures like Sam Rayburn and Lister Hill. While his activities have centered in Washington for nearly fifteen years, his spiritual home is still in the Northwest. It is this quality in his thinking that may have aroused the deepest response. He is not so radical as many of the Eastern New Dealers of the Roosevelt period, but neither is he so tired.

Although the impact of his SEC deeds has been often and fulsomely recognized, it is probably as an administrator that he has been given the widest measure of respect. Perhaps that is because he functioned at a time when the conservative press depicted all government administrators as bungling bureaucrats, and some of them seemed determined to live up to the reputation.

Douglas's political emergence would not automatically resuscitate all the elders of the New Deal. But it would restore direction to the liberal ranks. The continuity of his ideas is unmistakable; the words that so often seem borrowed on Mr. Truman's lips would recapture their original meaning. Douglas himself seemed to be describing this gap when he said at Roosevelt's grave: "Some of us are old enough to remember words that men have lived by and died for. And some of us are young enough to feel in words an emptiness not known before. I am concerned for the youth of our country and their distrust of the meaningless word. For them words are very tired unless they come from somewhere well behind the lips. They must represent deep conviction and enduring faith, a warmth and understanding of human values. They must be fortified by deeds."

When Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt invited Douglas to recite the eulogy at the unveiling of the Roosevelt plaque at Hyde Park last month, the gesture had dramatic political meaning. Of all the New Deal survivors he probably most closely approximates both the daring and the realism of the Roosevelt touch. But he lacks the spontaneity and easy grace of Roosevelt's public manner. And he has never campaigned. The truth is that up till now he has been a potential political figure rather than an actual one. Yet to many professionals as well as amateurs it will seem almost tragic if he is never given a trial.

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# The Russians and Berlin

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

*London, June 25*

TO UNDERSTAND more fully Russian behavior in Berlin it may be useful to recall the Soviet propaganda about Berlin during and after the war. All through the war Berlin was "the lair of the Fascist Beast," and as victory drew near I saw numerous letters from Russian soldiers at the front which declared that it would be the most monstrous injustice and the worst of Allied double-crossing if the Allies, and not the Red Army—"which had torn the guts out of the German army" at the cost to itself of seven million lives—were to reach Berlin first. During the final phases of the war there was genuine alarm that the Allies might indeed get there first and that the Germans "would throw the doors wide open." A sneaking suspicion existed that the Allies had voluntarily agreed to "let the Russians take Berlin"; but this was never officially announced, and Berlin became "one of the greatest Russian victories of the war—the final and supreme victory."

I remember Berlin at the end of May, 1945, when the Russians were still in sole charge. Colonel-General Berzarin, the commandant of Berlin, one of Zhukov's most distinguished field commanders—who was soon afterward to be killed in a street accident—made no secret at all of his great dislike of the impending arrival of the three other powers; "but we have had to agree to this for reasons of higher politics," and "as a contribution to Allied unity," and "for the sake of making the right impression on the Germans." For one thing, the measures already taken by Russia and its plans for the future were going to be badly upset, if not wasted. The whole tone of the city, in all the present four zones, was set by the "Anti-Fascist Association," in which Germans who had been released from Nazi concentration camps and other reliable anti-Nazis, mostly Communists but also a great number of ex-Social Democrats, played the leading part. The arrival of the Western Allies in Berlin inevitably spread confusion in the minds of the less diehard members of the ANTIFA and stimulated the deep-rooted German tendency to play off the Russians against the Anglo-Americans.

The "conditioning" of the defeated German people by the Russians was fatally undermined by the presence of the Western Allies in Berlin. Difficult propaganda lines, such as "The eastern frontier of Germany doesn't *really matter*," which with intensive effort and under certain conditions might have been put across—in the same way as "Teschen doesn't matter" had already been successfully put across in both Poland and Czechoslovakia—now became almost impossible to pursue.

In a country like Germany where everybody tends to "follow the crowd" the Russians felt that the complete impoverishment of the people would have facilitated the rapid progress of communism if it had not been for the confusing presence of the Allies. The presence of the Allies in Berlin was, in fact, resented by the Russian public all along, for ideological reasons, as well as for reasons of "national honor." Ever since the end of the war but especially during the past year magazines have been full of stories about the immense bloody battle the Russians fought for Berlin, with the "siege of the Reichstag" as its most dramatic and colorful episode. Berlin has been an inexhaustible subject for the theater and screen. Especially after the failure of the two conferences of foreign ministers on Germany in 1947—a failure for which of course the Russians blame the Allies far more than themselves, since the Allies "won't allow them into the Ruhr," to mention only the main grievance—the Russians made no secret of their view that the presence of the Western Allies in Berlin was "no longer justified by anything."

Most striking is the contrast between Russia's attitude toward Berlin and its attitude toward Vienna. Hardly anything is ever said or written about Vienna. Though it was the scene of "a great battle and a great victory," the ordinary Russian today is scarcely conscious of its existence. Extraordinarily little attention has been given by the press to the discussions of German assets. All the indications are that the Russians would cut their claims to Austrian reparations and agree to evacuate the country—provided of course certain "guaranties of neutrality" were given by Austria—in return for possession of Berlin.

Now that the currency reform in the western zones has split Germany into two parts even more effectively than it was before, the Russians are certain that the time is ripe for a settlement. The protracted and hair-splitting disputes over German assets in Austria have, to all appearances, been a Russian bargaining move all along. As I wrote as early as the Moscow conference of foreign ministers, the Russians have never had any intention of settling the question of Austria without first settling that of Germany—or at least Berlin.

*ALEXANDER WERTH, Moscow correspondent of* The Nation *and the Manchester* Guardian, *is now in England and able to file uncensored reports on Russia.*

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# *The A. P. Lends a Hand to TVA Wreckers*

BY MILES McMILLIN

THE Associated Press is lending itself to the campaign to destroy the Tennessee Valley Authority. An absolutely erroneous story charging the TVA with inability to prevent floods in the Tennessee Valley, which the A. P. has privately admitted was inaccurate but has never publicly corrected, is being used by utility propagandists in the current drive to wreck the TVA.

On February 14 the Atlanta bureau of the A. P. put on its night wire a round-up account of the flood situation in the South. The story pictured a vast area of desolation and suffering caused by the "turbulent flood waters." "Thousands of persons were driven from their homes," it declared. "Sub-freezing temperatures added to their misery."

The area hardest hit by the flood was in "central Tennessee," the dispatch said. Then came this statement: "On the Tennessee River the flood waters were too much for the great dams set up by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The huge reservoirs filled and the water was released to rush over the low country."

A check at Knoxville, TVA headquarters, disclosed that the A. P. bureau there knew nothing of the story, though it had gone out on the A. P. trunk line. There was a flood in Tennessee, but it was on the Duck River, a small stream in the central part of the state on which the TVA has no dam.

Meanwhile, wire photographs of the "Tennessee River floodwaters" were being distributed. The United Press had got itself involved by this time and was also sending out pictures. For the most part they were shots taken from the air, which made it impossible to identify the flooded areas.

Soon TVA, through its chief engineer, C. E. Blee, issued a statement declaring that the A. P. story was "wholly inaccurate." According to Mr. Blee, "none of TVA's flood-storage reservoirs on the tributaries or Kentucky reservoir, which is reserved for use in reducing floods on the lower Ohio and Mississippi, filled or even came remotely near filling. The flood-control system on the Tennessee River functioned as planned, and at no time was the release of water out of control."

The Chicago *Tribune*, which is campaigning to break up the TVA and sell it to the utilities, may or may not have checked the conflicting statements of TVA and A. P. to discover the truth. One report says that it called the A. P. Knoxville bureau and was told that the report of the Atlanta bureau was incorrect. At any rate, the *Tribune* came out with an editorial saying that it chose to believe the A. P., which "has no reason to distort the truth, but the TVA has every reason." The editorial continued, "It is a fundamental principle of engineering" that the TVA multiple-purpose system of dams cannot work. *Tribune* editors should know that according to fundamental principles of aerodynamics a bumble-bee can't fly.

Other newspapers checked with the A. P. and received an explanation from the Atlanta bureau. "A look back at the record," it ran, "shows that the following paragraph in our night lead, floods, February 14, was too broad. . . . I wrote from memory, having read the night story early in the morning. The fact that TVA was releasing water at Chickamauga stuck with me. The other facts did not. I should have referred again to the record before writing the night story. This reemphasizes to me the absolute necessity of rechecking all facts before writing the night story."

There is no evidence that the A. P. ever acknowledged its error publicly, though this explanation was given to newspapers which asked for it.

Utility propaganda agencies have pounced upon the A. P. story and are using it to prove that TVA's very efficient flood-control system has failed. E. Hofer and Sons, a publicity firm which the Black committee of the United States Senate exposed as a utility front, is giving it wide circulation. Hofer's *Industrial News Review*, which provides canned editorials that frequently find their way into newspapers throughout the country, recently carried this comment: "Even socialism can't lick nature—as a series of recent events has proved. The Tennessee Valley Authority has been praised to high heaven as a flood-control project. It has cost the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet when turbulent waters struck in mid-February, even TVA couldn't handle the job. In the words of an A. P. dispatch [here Hofer quotes the erroneous A. P. story]. There are some very obvious lessons in all this. First of all, neither free enterprise nor socialized enterprise can create a single drop of rainfall. All either can do is to make the most of what exists—and when it comes to that, free enterprise has always demonstrated a great superiority."

This incident does teach that free enterprise has one superiority: superior ability to tell a big lie and get it accepted.

*In the Far East the United States finds itself involved in the solution of pressing problems confronting two nations, one new, the other very old. Next week Yole Granada, sociologist and economist with the Natural Resources Division of SCAP, will discuss the problem of rebuilding Japan; and William Winter, analyst and commentator, will describe the Philippines after three years of independence with strings attached.*

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# American Flipflop in Indonesia

BY ANDREW ROTH

*Batavia, June 25*

THE press conference held by the United Nations' Good Offices Committee on June 18 in Batavia's pretentious Hotel des Indes was extremely revelatory. It was the first time since the Renville Agreement was signed in January that the committee had consented to meet the reporters, and it did so now only because there had been a mysterious leakage to the press of an American-Australian plan for a settlement and the Dutch had thereupon suspended negotiations.

In the conference room, scene of many fruitless discussions between the Dutch and the Republicans, the American delegate, a gruff, red-faced consular veteran named Coert Dubois, took a seat next to the alert Australian delegate, T. K. Critchley, and at some distance from R. Herremans, the suave Belgian representative. The American and the Australian not only sat next to each other but spoke virtually as one man. Contradicting and opposing the Belgian delegate, they implicitly advocated pressure by the committee on the Dutch to make them agree to a settlement fair to the Republicans.

Australian policy has been based on the belief that nationalism's victory in Indonesia is inevitable and that it is to Australia's interest to have a friendly northern neighbor. This conviction led to Australia's sponsorship of the republic at the U. N.; in return the republic designated Australia as its representative on the Good Offices Committee. Belgium's sympathies are with its Dutch neighbor: its present prosperity is largely dependent on the dollar-producing Congo, and it doesn't want to see any cracks in colonial systems. Until very recently American policy has been somewhat closer to the pro-Dutch Belgians than to the pro-Republican Australians.

During the discussions in the Security Council provoked by the Dutch military offensive the United States delegate found it necessary to state: "I repeat I am not here as an advocate of the Netherlands government. . . ." But in effect he was. Like the Dutch he referred to the "so-called Republic of Indonesia." In sharp contrast with the overwhelmingly pro-Republican stand of American newspapers, American official policy was that the Dutch military offensive, while regrettable, was mainly the republic's fault. The United States supported Dutch requests for delays while Dutch troops were advancing. It opposed the Soviet proposal for a withdrawal of Dutch troops to their jumping-off places. It voted to invite the Dutch-erected semi-puppet states of Borneo and East Indonesia to give testimony. With Dutch consent it offered its "good offices" to settle the dispute *outside the U. N.*

Just before the Dutch attack on July 20, the United States, in an official note, had tried to make the republic accept the increasingly stiff Dutch terms. When the republic refused, many Dutch leaders thought they had United States support for their "police action." This impression was strengthened when on August 7 the International Bank, in which the United States exercises dominant influence, granted the Netherlands a loan of $195,000,000 for economic reconstruction. Although the loan was not for military purposes, Holland's home economy and its military strength in Indonesia are closely connected.

United States tenderness for the Dutch had substantial motivation. For the past year the State Department's goal has been to contain communism in Europe by building a Western bloc. It naturally, therefore, wants to strengthen Holland, as an integral part of this bloc, by allowing it to retain Indonesia. A study of pre-war trade statistics reveals the striking extent to which Indonesian exports financed Holland's dollar purchases. In 1937, a typical year, Indonesia shipped to the United States $98,000,000 worth of goods but imported only $27,000,000 worth, which left a dollar surplus of over $70,000,000. Holland, however, exported only $32,000,000 of goods to the United States and imported $75,000,000 worth, making up the deficit with the Indonesian surplus. Obviously, Holland's post-war prosperity is dependent on continued exploitation of Indonesian resources.

Enthusiastic support for this pro-Dutch policy has come from American business firms which traded with the Indies before the war. The American share of foreign investments in the region, which total almost three billion dollars, is not large—it falls far below the Dutch and British share—but the interested firms have considerable influence in Washington; among them are Standard Oil, Standard Vacuum, Caltex, Goodyear, United States Rubber, National Carbon, Procter and Gamble, and General Motors. Many other concerns would like to see a return of the pre-war conditions under which important raw materials were produced here by cheap labor.

The original American delegate to the Good Offices Committee, Dr. Frank P. Graham, gained a sympathetic hearing from the Republican leaders through his known

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liberal views and used his opportunity to persuade them to accept the vaguely worded Renville Agreement. Under this agreement the republic acknowledged the Dutch military conquest of its richest areas in exchange for a future plebiscite on participation in a United States of Indonesia. When Mr. Dubois first replaced Dr. Graham as American representative, he continued Washington's pro-Dutch attitude. But it has become clear since then that no real economic stability is possible here without political stability. Yet instead of concentrating on seeking a basis for permanent peace Lieutenant Governor General H. J. Van Mook has been chiefly occupied with erecting in Dutch-occupied areas a group of states controlled by feudal and other pro-Dutch elements.

THE American delegate on the committee did not move really close to the Australian delegate until pushed by Moscow. Soviet consular recognition of the Indonesian Republic in May spotlighted the fact that America's pro-Dutch attitude was giving the Communists a free field among the nationalists of the area. In Jokjakarta the People's Democratic Front, a leftist coalition spearheaded by the militant Socialist Party of former Premier Amir Sjarifuddin but including the much smaller Communist Party, has swung left. It used to advocate friendly relations with both power groups and acceptance of foreign investments under certain conditions, but recently it decided that Indonesia was in danger from the "capitalist nations." This stiffening of the left in Jokjakarta coincided with an upsurge of Communist-influenced groups throughout Southeast Asia. In Malaya the British authorities have felt compelled to proclaim special security measures. Singapore officials are convinced that the unrest is all part of a Moscow-directed plan to deny the fruits of the reconquest of this area to the Western powers. They point out that the first Soviet Minister in Siamese history has arrived in Bangkok.

Meanwhile Washington has realized the strategic value of Indonesia. At the moment China, Korea, and Japan are the front lines of the "cold war" in Asia, but this rear area is of great importance. The United States air force is intensively mapping Dutch Borneo preparatory to building air fields. Borneo shoulders the South China Sea and could be an excellent base for bombing North and Central Asia.

Using the argument of the "red menace," the Southeast Asia Division of the State Department has engineered a change in Washington's line in the Good Offices Committee. As a result there have been two joint Australian-American attempts to settle the Indonesian question. The first, an "oral note" read to both parties, was quickly dropped for a more detailed proposal which Mr. Dubois and Mr. Critchley submitted to Dr. Van Mook and Premier Hatta on June 10.

The Australian-American draft must be considered a fair basis for discussion by anyone desiring a peaceful settlement here without prejudice to the right of democratic self-determination. It proposes a secret-ballot election to a constituent assembly which will also be a provisional parliament and will name a provisional government. The Dutch are to grant full self-government immediately, and the republic is to transfer all attributes of sovereignty, including control of foreign relations, foreign trade, currency, and the armed forces. Dutch citizens would have the same treatment as Indonesians in the matter of taxation and the same rights in trade. The United States of Indonesia would become a sovereign part of a Netherlands Union, co-equal with the Netherlands and recognizing the supremacy of the House of Orange. The Governor General would be empowered to exercise a veto over acts of the provisional government which contravened the U. N. Charter or the Union Statute—linking the U. S. I. to the Netherlands. He would also direct the employment of armed forces within Indonesia, with the consent of the provisional government. Joint commissions would handle the restoration of foreign property now in Republican hands, the reduction of the armed forces of both sides, and the delineation of future component states. Until elections are held in these states their representatives in the Constituent Assembly would form their interim governments.

Both in Batavia and in The Hague the Dutch have blown up over these proposals. They have attacked the manner and timing of their submission, charged that they violate the Renville Agreement, and hinted that Dubois is acting on his own hook without State Department support. And using the highly suspicious leakage of the whole plan to the press as an excuse—a leakage in which American consular officials see a deft Dutch hand—they have broken off G. O. C. discussions.

The main reason for the Dutch attitude is that the proposals completely set aside the carefully contrived structure of semi-puppet states on which Dr. Van Mook has been working. Representatives of these Dutch-influenced states have already been called together in a federal conference at Bandung and set to work on a projected constitution. Officially this conference has merely "advisory" powers, but the Dutch have hoped that by some political sleight of hand they might get its recommendations accepted as a constitution for the U. S. I. and the conference itself recognized as a provisional parliament. They have also hoped that the republic might be forced into joining by a continuation of the present economic blockade. If the republic gave too much trouble after the creation of this pro-Dutch rump U. S. I., the Dutch army, according to this scheme, could mop it up at the invitation of the pro-Dutch Indonesians.

Although the Australian-American proposal has been shelved, the Australian delegate is moderately optimistic because he now has American support. It is clear that the

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Dutch, who have recorded their need here for a loan of $400,000,000, could be bludgeoned by Washington into accepting a reasonable solution. Mr. Critchley was concerned that the United States delegate to the Security Council's June 17 session was apparently not acting on the same instructions as the American member of the Good Offices Committee. He naturally fears that another reversal in United States policy will make the situation here much more critical. He is also discouraged by the announcement of the British Foreign Office that it will no longer honor Republican passports.

In closing the press conference the Belgian delegate said that the solution of the Indonesian problem was a "secret of the future." To most impartial observers Washington's belatedly acquired political intelligence gives hope that the secret will be revealed before too long.

# *Memoirs of Eduard Benes*

## IV. THE SOVIET-GERMAN PACT AND AFTER

FROM my own personal experience I cannot say how, by what initiative, or through whom the negotiations for the German-Soviet accord of August, 1939, were started. According to Stalin, the initiative came from the Germans. I myself was informed both from Prague and from Moscow, in May, 1939, that economic negotiations were going on between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Rightly or wrongly, I drew very far-reaching conclusions. I regarded the Soviet-French-English conversations as definitely ended, and believed that the Soviet Union would now orient itself solely according to its own advantage and security. Knowing itself unprepared, it would seek to postpone war as long as possible and meanwhile prepare feverishly for war. At the same time I was sure that Russia would not lose sight of its eventual revolutionary goal, even though it might be forced into apparently or really illogical action.

I followed step by step, almost as with a microscope, every subsequent move of Soviet policy. Early on the morning of July 19, 1939, General Ingr and Colonel Moravec reported to me that they had received information from Germany of very active negotiations between Hitler and Stalin. Between August 10 and 12 we had by the same route further important news—that the decisive point had been reached on the night of August 3-4.

[Convinced that a German-Soviet treaty was in the making, Dr. Benes sought out the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, to discuss the matter.]

*The third instalment of this somewhat abridged version of Dr. Benes's Memoirs repeated a conversation that took place between the exiled Czechoslovak President and Franklin D. Roosevelt a few months before war broke out. The fifth chapter, to appear next week, describes a second meeting, in May, 1943. It also contains the author's comments on the divided counsels in Washington before America entered the war. Bracketed passages in the articles are condensations by the editors.*

I left Maisky with certain clear impressions. He did not agree with my view that the German-Soviet treaty meant that the Germans wanted to attack Poland immediately. My information from Germany that the war would break out soon he received with great doubt. Neither France nor England, he thought, would go to war at this time, and Poland alone would not dare to. "There will obviously be a second Munich. France and England forced the first on Europe against our will; they will force another on Europe of which Poland is the victim." He was very reserved on his country's policy. I got the impression that Russia would attempt to remain neutral as long as possible, so that when both sides were exhausted and the war neared an end, it could come in, decide the outcome, and enforce a solution of European problems along social-revolutionary lines.

I went to Paris at the beginning of October, 1939, to negotiate the formation of a Czechoslovak government and a Czechoslovak army on French soil. A Communist member of our parliament, J. Sverma, came to see me. He realized my difficulties with Daladier and tried to persuade me to abandon the West and move to Russia. I told him that I considered it necessary to stick with the West. I was anxious above all, cost what it might, to assure the unity of the liberation movement.

Sverma objected that the situation in the West would press me toward the right, away from the Soviet Union, and send me into the arms of reaction. I insisted that from the very start our efforts for liberation must be given the correct line—progressive, national, and unifying—Western and Eastern at the same time.

The talk with Sverma made me realize to the full how sharply our Communists, under the influence of the Russian Communists, differed from me about the expected course of the war. We both believed that the Soviet Union would come in. The Communists, however, believed it would do so only toward the end of the war, when neither of the hostile camps would have the strength to prevent or resist the social revolution. I

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could not imagine that either the Western powers or Germany would fail to see through the Soviet calculations and behave accordingly. It seemed certain that one or the other would do everything in its power to draw the Soviet Union into the war as soon as possible.

I WAS therefore not surprised when I received information from home, during the early months of the war, about the reserved if not actually negative attitude of the Communists toward our national liberation movement. I saw the same influences, calculations, and ideas, perhaps even instructions, in our London Communists' decision, in August and September, 1939, to move into the background after their initial eager participation in the liberation struggle. Our Communists in London began at this time to issue leaflets against us, and from my friends in Prague I had news of Communist propaganda in the same style at home.

In the instructions which I sent to Czechoslovakia I continually warned our resistance groups not to be deceived by the behavior of the Communists. I never dismissed the possibility that the Soviet Union would soon be drawn into the war, and then, I knew, our Communist Party would be obliged to change its tune.

In late December, 1939, the Soviet government informed our minister, Zdenek Fierlinger, that his mission in Moscow was at an end. We had expected this, for on September 16, 1939, the Soviet Union had recognized the Tiso government in Slovakia. However, I noted the emphasis with which the Soviet government spoke of "the meaninglessness of these various formalities," as Minister Fierlinger took his departure from Moscow. Therefore in my broadcast to the homeland after the fall of France I said that I was still counting on the entry into the war of "that great eastern factor"—Russia.

The Soviet-Finnish war, declared on November 30, 1939, was right in line with my conception of world events. For me it meant that the Soviet Union was heading directly for its own goals, without regard to the German-Finnish alliance or German desires, that it wanted to insure itself against Germany and was prepared to take the consequences—expulsion from the League of Nations and an attempt by Daladier to draw France and England into hostilities against it.

According to Daladier's plan, France was to have been removed from the war against Germany some time earlier. Germany was then to have been pressed to attack the Soviet Union alone, having made peace with the Western powers. But I insisted to my collaborators that they must continue to be very reserved in their political attitude toward the Soviet Union and that they must not give in to the anti-Soviet propaganda then being spread abroad from America.

[At the end of January, 1941, Dr. Benes had an interview with General Wladyslaw Sikorski, head of the Polish government in exile. Sikorski considered himself at war not only with Germany but also with the Soviet Union. Discounting Soviet participation in the war as an ally of the Western powers, he believed that the outcome would be decided by the United States, which would come to the aid of England and Poland after Germany had crushed Russia. The argument of Dr. Benes that the war could not be won by the West without the Soviet Union failed to convince him.]

> *The movement on both sides was toward a compact. This violent and unnatural reversal of Russian policy was a transmogrification of which only totalitarian states are capable. Barely two years since, the leaders of the Russian army—Tukachevsky and several thousand of its most accomplished officers—had been slaughtered for the very inclinations which now became acceptable to the handful of anxious masters of the Kremlin. Then pro-Germanism had been heresy and treason. Now, overnight, it was the policy of the state, and woe was mechanically meted out to any who dared dispute it, and often to those not quick enough on the turn-about.*—WINSTON CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS.

The talk with Sikorski and other conversations on a Polish-Czechoslovak accord made me realize the basic conflict between us. I was therefore very cautious in all negotiations with the London Poles. First with Sikorski and then with Mikolajczyk I attempted to make it clear that in their own interests they should work for real agreement with the Soviet Union.

Information we received from Prague fully confirmed my expectations. The Soviet Union still hoped to postpone participation in the war as long as possible. However, in the Battle of Britain Hitler failed to crush British resistance and force Churchill to make peace. The Soviet Union was then obliged, whether it liked it or not, to note Hitler's desperate dilemma: what would happen if the British fought on, continually strengthened by aid from the United States, and if the Soviet preparations, either for war or a great social revolution, should reach their maximum intensity while Britain was still at war? For Germany this was a glimpse of catastrophe.

Hitler at once made the fatal decision, expecting, with his inadequate political skill, that he could somehow retrieve the situation. Since the United States was not yet in the war, he decided that he must forestall Soviet military preparations and Russia's eventual entry into the war by a sudden attack. He hoped he could convince the Western powers of Soviet plans for world revolution and move them to make peace with Germany to free his hand in the East. Vichy France was undoubtedly willing to do this.

At the beginning of March, 1941, Colonel Moravec brought me information that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union: "The expedition against the

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Soviet Union has already been definitely decided. As soon as Germany finishes the Yugoslav campaign, at latest in the first half of May, there will be a German military move against the Soviet Union. The date for the *Kriegsbereitschaft* on the whole eastern front has been set for May 15." Attached to this report were various technical details. The facts were so serious that I did not dare pass them on to the Allies in full detail immediately, although I did communicate the main points to the British, the Americans, and the Soviets. I informed Winston Churchill about the report under rather dramatic circumstances.

On April 19 I had invited Churchill to visit our brigade in Leamington. At noon, before the army review, we had dinner with Ronald Tree, M. P. Besides Churchill and some other Englishmen, the American ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, and the commander of the American air force, General Arnold, were present. After dinner we talked about coming events in the war, and I had a chance to discuss in detail the expected German attack on the Soviet Union and to express my conviction that Russia's participation in the war was already decided on, in principle. "Precisely when and how it will happen will be decided not by Stalin but by Hitler," I said.

Winston Churchill, as he told me later, had already received information from the United States on Hitler's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union. My facts clarified, confirmed, and rounded out what he already knew. At that time England stood alone against Germany and was suffering greatly. It can be well imagined how Churchill received my news and my opinions. He returned three times to the same question, constantly reiterating: "And you believe that the Soviet Union will really fight, that it can hold out, that its officers' corps will be able enough?" I assured Churchill that I had confidence in the Soviet Union.

After dinner we went to visit our army in Churchill's car and continued to discuss the Red Army, its preparedness, its morale, the ability of its officers' corps. The last question especially bothered Churchill, for memories of Tukachevsky and the purge of officers in 1936-37 were still alive. He also asked about Russia's moral and political situation and economic preparedness.

I understood his questions better when I learned, later, what kind of information he was then receiving from the British intelligence service and Polish sources in London. One might say that their reports were almost unanimous: "If there should be a German-Soviet war, the Soviet Union would be liquidated in eight to ten weeks." The Goebbels propaganda service, after the attack on Russia, said exactly the same thing.

# *The Soft Squeeze of Newsprint*

BY GEORGE TICHENOR

THE sensation is very much like having a soft pillow pressed gently over your face. There appears no possibility of outcry; there will be no messy trail of blood. Very soon you will be a statistic. That's how it feels to be a publisher suffocated by shortage of newsprint.

It is the quiet manner in which small papers die that is so distressing. Let someone propose a bill outlawing religious, labor, and fraternal papers, and trumpets and lawyers would blare. But let the same end be effected by cutting off the supply of newsprint to those little papers, and the public stifles a yawn and buys a bigger copy of the *Metropolitan Monolith* with two pages more of comics and sixteen pages more of ads.

There will be no tocsin's wild alarum over the following facts: A handful of metropolitan papers—about 200—are now getting 85 per cent of available newsprint, while 17,000 papers struggle for the remaining 15 per cent. The United States, with 6 per cent of the world's population, gets about 60 per cent of the world's production of newsprint; this hampers the spread of democratic ideas abroad and causes loss of jobs to foreign newspapermen and newspaperwomen. The situation promises to grow worse as the Marshall Plan permits the purchase of newsprint from abroad, as increases in the circulation and advertising of our metropolitan papers bump against a production ceiling, and as it becomes clear that no substantial rise in newsprint production is in prospect in the next few years.

No intention to come to grips with the problem is evident. Two bills introduced after the furor of Senate and House investigations a year ago languished in the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

*Editor and Publisher* for May 1 expressed surprise that "all of a sudden" the American newspaper industry was told that the E. R. P. administration planned to send 288,000 tons of newsprint to Iceland and the United Kingdom during the next fifteen months. *Editor and Publisher* suggested that the British be allowed to import

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only pulpwood and make the paper themselves, even though it would cost them more.

During the war all papers subsisted more or less comfortably on quota allotments. Troubles started when the American Newspaper Publishers' Association quietly pushed for the lifting of controls, January 1, 1946. If any of the unorganized small papers—community, fraternal, and religious papers—were aware of what was happening they may have been reassured by the association's promise that "the newspapers of the United States will see that no newspaper suspends publication for lack of newsprint," and by a news release of the Civilian Production Administration which said, "Mr. Small [CPA administrator] emphasized that in the event the voluntary plan breaks down and newspapers are threatened with suspension of publication, this agency will act promptly to reinstate newsprint controls."

Immediately three things happened: (1) Total consumption of newsprint in the United States spurted to 4,296,268 tons in 1946, an increase of 28.4 per cent over 1945 and an increase of many thousands of tons over peak consumption in pre-war years. Advertising lineage increased 26.2 per cent for 100 leading papers—46.4 per cent for the New York *Times,* 45.4 per cent for the Chicago *Tribune,* and 73.3 per cent for the Miami *Herald.* (2) Little papers found themselves in acute distress. In New York, for example, about fifty papers printed at the Rogowski and Pentagon plants were cut in size—50 per cent at one plant and 40 per cent at the other. Others were at times suspended for from one day to two weeks. (3) The A. N. P. A. and government agencies appeared greatly concerned with distant horizons.

On April 2, 1946, a delegation of Eastern editors called on Mr. Small to make good his promise to reinstate controls if papers were "threatened" with suspension. Mr. Small expressed surprise. The Civilian Production Administration had form letters for persons who persisted in asking why Small's promise was not made good, ending with the statement that any kind of allocation of newsprint would interfere with "freedom of the press."

The same situation prevailed in other parts of the country; a Newsprint Consumers' Emergency Committee set up at a packed meeting of the New York Newspaper Guild received complaints and appeals from as far away as California. Then the crisis eased.

Almost a year to the day later, in the spring of 1947, the shortage again hit small papers. After running several half-size issues, we were notified that after March 3 the *Cooperator* was suspended. I had already exhausted Finnish, Swedish and Canadian sources, so I went hat in hand to the A. N. P. A. I discovered that there were several jokers in A. N. P. A. benevolence. A newspaper meant a "bona fide newspaper," one with second-class mailing permit, and a "loan" rather than a sale of paper might be considered sufficient help. (How a "loan" could be repaid in kind in the face of a shrinking supply was a little problem between you and the gray market.) Having satisfied all technicalities, we still did not get any paper because, as William Mapel, vice-chairman of the Publishers' Association of New York, wrote, "We are told the Rogowski Printing Company is supplied . . . by the Clinton Paper Company . . . pound for pound the newsprint supplied in 1946. . . . Consequently the problem . . . would seem to be one between you and Rogowski, rather than you and the A. N. P. A."

PAPER rolled into the Rogowski plant on March 4, the day that hearings began in Washington before a subcommittee of the Senate Small Business Committee headed by Homer E. Capehart of Indiana and including Harry P. Cain of Washington, Edward Martin of Pennsylvania, James E. Murray of Montana, and Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana. Cranston Williams, general manager of the A. N. P. A., testified: "We have had over 600 individual cases, and . . . we do not know of a single paper that suspended publication for the sole reason of lack of newsprint."

> *Senator Capehart:* If they suspended because they had so little newsprint over a period of six months or a year that they lost their capital, then they would be suspended as a result of the shortage of newsprint.
>
> *Mr. Williams:* Yes.
>
> *Senator Capehart:* They just went broke without enough newsprint to make a profit.

According to Mr. Williams not a single new newsprint mill was under construction in the world. In Canada, where 78 per cent of this country's supply originates, "the mills are running at capacity and there is not a single idle newsprint machine."

Michael J. de Sherbinin, editor of the *Bulletin* of the American Veterans' Committee, one of the papers printed by Rogowski, told how his paper had been cut 50 per cent at the plant. Then he had privately approached Clinton, Rogowski's supplier, and bought paper from him at about double the market price.

Mr. Lavine of Rogowski for the first time got a public hearing on his story, and Samuel Galewitz, vice-president of Clinton, was called before the subcommittee. What he said was considered sufficiently interesting to be classed under "Highlights" in the Interim Report which condensed three volumes of testimony. Mr. Galewitz said that he had contracts with two mills, International Paper Company and Bowater Paper Company, for 6,000 tons a year each. He had resold the paper received from Bowater to William K. Friedman, a New York lawyer. "Clinton Paper Company's contract with Bowater Paper Company calls for a price of $84 per ton, Mr. Galewitz stated, and he had negotiated the sale of the 6,000-ton contract . . . at $160 per ton. This represents a profit of approximately $456,000 annually for the two-year period

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of the contract." And whom did Mr. Friedman buy for? The *Guild Reporter* declared that the eventual user was the Miami *Herald*, whose advertising lineage soared 73.3 per cent in 1946.

Robert M. Fowler, president of the Newsprint Association of Canada, thought it preposterous to talk about a shortage. "The newsprint problem of the United States is not a problem of supply but a problem of equitable distribution. . . . The total United States supply is adequate to meet all legitimate requirements of a free press. It may not be sufficient to enable the publishing industry to take full advantage of all the commercial opportunities offered by the present market. But this is not a unique disability among American industries today."

He and Senator Capehart commiserated with each other on the difficulties of pleasing everybody.

> *Senator Capehart:* When I sit down and start thinking, I come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to do the job. I think we can help the situation, but in helping the situation materially we are likewise going to make a lot of enemies. In other words, I think we will bring other problems on ourselves.
>
> *Mr. Fowler:* That is the thing, Senator; you cure one thing and have another problem.
>
> *Senator Capehart:* We have this situation where we can do nothing or we can try to do something, or the government has to allocate the newsprint, and I am opposed to allocation.

On that solemn and complex thought we tiptoe away.

OUT of the hearings came two bills, one introduced by Senator Capehart (S. 1080) reflecting the majority opinion, and another by Senator Murray (S. 1718) reflecting a minority view shared by Senator Taylor.

The Capehart bill would provide a pool of newsprint administered by a nine-man committee, three of whom would be nominated by the A. N. P. A., two by the National Editorial Association, one by the National Paper Trade Association, two by the United States newsprint mills, and one by the National Publishers Association (no representatives of small publishers of course). For its particular purpose it would be exempt from anti-trust action.

Senators Murray and Taylor objected in their minority report that "there is no guaranty of equality of sacrifice on the part of papers which might be asked to contribute. . . . Nor is there any guaranty of equality of benefit on the part of papers whose distress will be relieved . . . there is absolutely no provision either in the subcommittee's report or in the proposed legislation for the guaranty of newsprint to any newcomer in the field. . . . The most terrifying provision . . . is the 'blank check' exemption from anti-trust laws which is given to the nine-man committee. What safeguards are there to prevent the denial of paper to existing or new publications because of their politics, or because of competitive grudges or interests?"

The Murray bill also calls for a pool to be administered by the Secretary of Commerce aided by an advisory committee drawn from *hoi polloi* of the publishing industry, to which papers in distress could appeal. For the period of the shortage it would limit a publisher's amount of newsprint in any one quarter to not more than 120 per cent of the amount the publisher used in the third quarter of 1945—or in special cases another quarter of 1945. The Commodity Credit Corporation would purchase paper for the pool "not to exceed 5 per cent of the volume of newsprint consumed in the United States in . . . 1946." Publishers in distress, unable to obtain newsprint for their own use in the amount permitted, would apply to the Administration, which could, upon a showing of need, issue to them a certificate of approval for an amount up to but not in excess of the quota. New users of newsprint would be issued certificates of approval.

The National Organization of Small Publishers, which grew out of the small papers' emergency committee, favors the Murray bill. The Cooperative League of the United States, whose relatively small consumer-owned papers have been affected by the shortage, also indorses it.

Newsprint scarcity has of course affected price, further burdening small users caught in the tightening vise of decreasing supplies, decreasing circulation, decreasing advertising, and mounting costs. In 1929 newsprint was $58 to $60 a ton f. o. b. New York; in 1939, $50; in 1947, $91; and in 1948, $97.

Our own forests are pretty well depleted, and Premier Drew of Ontario has started a ten-year plan to end pulpwood exports. Alaska? A report just released by Senator Capehart's committee after a visit to the territory declares, with italics for emphasis, that "the subcommittee wishes to emphasize that, contrary to popular opinion and belief, there is no guaranty that development of the Alaskan wood-pulp industry will increase the total United States output of newsprint."

Sam Eubanks, executive vice-president of the American Newspaper Guild, is urging that the guild support the Murray bill or take other action to break the bottleneck impeding newsprint flow to small publishers. He comments: "Why talk about a free press if a paper hasn't the paper to be free with? What good are guild contracts if a publisher can say, 'I can't print'?" But the big press counters guild logic with the kind of figures that decide policy. As the Chicago *Tribune* announced on a recent cover of *Editor and Publisher*: "According to Media records, the year's total volume in 1947, as in 1946, placed the Chicago *Tribune* first among the newspapers measured by that organization. The 1947 volume was the largest ever recorded for any newspaper since Media records began the measurement of newspaper advertising lineage."

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# *The El Paso Story*

BY CAREY McWILLIAMS

*Los Angeles, June 28*

ON A recent cross-country trip, broken by wide detours and stop-overs, I became aware that a sense of political frustration was plaguing the liberals in many of the communities I visited. The feeling seemed to reach its highest pitch in El Paso. On first inspection I saw little reason for it, for together the minorities there form a clear-cut majority and if united behind a progressive program could easily make their influence felt. As in most border towns no one knows the exact size of El Paso's Spanish-speaking community, but it is generally estimated to compose about 65 per cent of the total population; add some 4,000 Negroes and 2,000 Jews, with considerable C. I. O. strength in the smelters and other industrial plants, and the set-up would seem to be ideal for progressive political action. That, alas, is not the case. The liberals whom I interviewed—religious leaders, social workers, civil servants, teachers, professional people—were extremely pessimistic about the prospects, and I soon learned why.

Hardened as one may be to the discrepancies between ideals and realities in American political life, it comes as something of a shock to be told, as I was told on all sides in El Paso, that the secrecy of the ballot in western Texas is a myth. On going to the polls in El Paso the voter signs his name and address in a register under a serial number which also appears on the ballot he marks. El Pasoans with whom I discussed local politics are convinced that ballots are customarily checked to see how certain individuals voted and that afterward people often lose their jobs.

In a five-day visit I was of course unable to get specific evidence that this practice exists, but the belief that it does was expressed with striking unanimity. And the belief has a most inhibiting effect on a large number of voters. Other manifestations of tight control of opinion were also cited: for example, an official of an industrial plant was able to secure the dismissal of a teacher at Texas College of Mines and Arts by merely requesting it.

That progressive political action is badly needed in El Paso was apparent at once. Many of the poorer Mexican families live in old adobe houses built around an interior court in which is a central hydrant for water. A recent survey of the housing conditions of 200 families (7.06 persons per family) living in such courts revealed 10.06 families using a single toilet (71.02 persons per toilet!), and showed that only 5.05 per cent of the dwellings had shower facilities, only 3 per cent bathtubs, and only 3 per cent private toilets. For many years the great majority of the deaths among children from typhoid fever, smallpox, scarlet fever, whooping cough, measles, diphtheria, enteritis, and diarrhea have been reported from South El Paso, where most of the Mexicans live.

Although an increasing number of Spanish-speaking students are finishing high school and going on to college, these young people find the range of occupations open to them so limited that they seldom stay in El Paso. A leading merchant told me that one of his truck drivers, of a Spanish-speaking family, enlisted in the army at the outbreak of war and rose to the rank of captain. On leaving the service this man tried to find some employment offering better opportunities, but after a few months he applied for his old position.

One gets the impression that the political control is so strict because the "better elements" fear the latent power of the "minorities." But so far the Mexican, Negro, and Jewish groups have had little influence, and with the exception of one Spanish-speaking person on the school board hold no political offices. The Jewish community is made up for the most part of old-settler families, many of whom have prospered over the years and have come to feel a largely fictitious security because of the absence of obvious forms of discrimination. The Negro community, while small, is rigidly segregated; there is a single all-Negro school with a Negro faculty, and Jim Crow practices prevail in the cafes, restaurants, and movie theaters. It was Dr. L. A. Nixon, a Negro dentist in El Paso, who first challenged the "white primary" in Texas and whose case was before the United States Supreme Court on three occasions before his right to vote in the Democratic Party primary in Texas was vindicated. The Spanish-speaking group is ripe for organized action and has an endless list of social grievances, many of which date back fifty years. It has only begun to achieve real political maturity, but leaders are emerging and the day of political reckoning cannot be long deferred.

If the "better elements" are fearful of the potential political strength of the Spanish-speaking group, they still show no inclination to remedy the conditions under which it suffers. A few years ago the president of the El Paso school board told the press that the board had rejected federal aid to day nurseries on the ground that 90 per cent of the benefits would be enjoyed by persons of Mexican descent.

El Paso is really a Western city on which Southern folkways have been encroaching for many years. One is surprised not so much by the Jim Crow practices and the subjection of a large Mexican population as by the spectacle of a city but one remove from the frontier whose residents are afraid to express their political convictions. The situation seems to call for a Congressional inquiry. If such an inquiry dispelled the widespread belief that ballots are compared with voters' names to discover political allegiances, it would serve an excellent purpose. If it confirmed the belief, it might force some reform in electoral methods in Texas.

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# *Del Vayo*—Family Fight

THE worst that can happen in the situation of continuing danger created by the crumbling of American-Soviet relations is that any of the contenders should indulge in wishful thinking about his opponent's weakness or difficulties. For example, since 1946 the Russians have been far too ready to believe that the United States would suffer an internal financial collapse by 1948 at the latest—a collapse which would force this country to abandon its attempt to redesign post-war Europe on an American pattern. Today Americans are making a similar mistake. Although the official attitude in Washington is one of caution mingled with hope, one finds in the press and in private comment a tendency to regard the present clash between the Cominform and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the beginning of the end—the disintegration of the Eastern bloc. The situation, according to this view, holds out an invitation to the United States to accelerate the get-tough policy and exploit Russia's difficulties to the limit by extending to the Eastern countries the methods which have brought Italy and Greece into line.

To anyone familiar with the Russians' usually keen sense of reality, this view is quite unconvincing. They would never bring out in the open a disagreement which, from the start, they were not sure they could master. Least of all would they have chosen to make the affair public at a moment when the Soviet Union is engaged in one of the most difficult struggles it has faced since the end of the war—the defense in Berlin of what it considers its fundamental interests. Had the Kremlin not felt confident that it could resolve this dispute to its own satisfaction, it would at least have waited until the end of the Berlin crisis to announce to the world the decisions reached by the Cominform in Bucharest. To suggest that the Soviet leaders may have erred in their judgment of Tito's character and of his certain reactions to their attack is to underestimate their knowledge of the people with whom they work so closely. It is only necessary to read the June Bulletin of the Cominform—the last one published in Belgrade—to see how the Russians have regarded Tito. In the light of the past week's events one can guess the implications of the quotation from Lenin printed there: "All revolutionary parties that have perished up to now, perished because of their conceit"; or of the references to leaders who "have lost all sense of proportion" and who "rest on their laurels instead of exercising an indispensable self-criticism."

So far all signs indicate that, no matter what expectations and illusions the incident may arouse in Western capitals, the Russians believe the question of maintaining the solidarity of the Eastern bloc can be separated from the question of the relations between the national parties aligned in the Communist front. To stress this point of view, the Russians released simultaneously with the reprimand to the Yugoslav party a happy portrait of the Foreign Ministers in Warsaw, showing a smiling Molotov beside a smiling Simich, both listening with obvious pleasure to Mr. Clementis, the Czech Foreign Minister, whose wit I know very well. Other facts point the same way. The Bulgarian Communist Party has sided with the Cominform against Tito; at the same time the Communist-controlled Bulgarian press has reaffirmed its indissoluble friendship with Yugoslavia. *Pravda,* the Moscow party organ, has commented mildly on the rift in the coalition, but the rest of the Soviet press, including *Izvestia,* the government paper, has said nothing.

One argument against my theory that the incident is more a Communist Party issue than a problem of foreign policy is Tito's defiant pronouncement in favor of a Balkan bloc, a plan the Russians slapped down when Dimitrov of Bulgaria proposed it last year. Though accused of delusions of grandeur, Tito could hardly expect to set up a bloc by himself which would play an independent role between the two giants. Nor is he ready to turn to the West. In his Manifesto of Independence the Yugoslav leader insisted that the policy against war and warmongers should be continued "under the great leadership of the Soviet Union."

Among the many differing interpretations of the motive behind this stirring episode I am inclined to share the view that it is a prelude to a revision of Communist tactics regarding coalitions on the left. I regret the necessity of doing so. In spite of all the difficulties—the experience of the Nenni party in its relations with the Communists in Italy, our own differences with the Spanish Communists in exile, the struggle in the C. G. T. in France—it is my firm conviction that we must return finally to the political formula of the Popular Front. The battle against mounting reaction everywhere and, even more immediate, the battle to save the peace can be won only by a new alignment of the world's anti-fascist forces. Evidently the predominant view in the Cominform is otherwise. The merger of Socialist and Communist parties in the Eastern countries, one after the other, leaves the left Socialists in the rest of Europe without any practical means of supporting a common policy with the elements in Eastern Europe which until now have been carrying on an independent and important battle.

Seen from that angle, the conflict with Tito and the decision of the last meeting of the Cominform may be considered the prelude to a revision of the Communist position in relation to other left groups and working-class parties. The attack upon the Communist Party in Yugoslavia, where the Popular Front, although firmly controlled by the Communists, is more effective than in any other country of the Eastern bloc, was a logical move. But no matter how complicated the issue may turn out to be from the point of view of Communist politics, it has not very much to do with the future of the Eastern bloc and its effect on world affairs. Since Stalin so far has remained out of the whole dispute, final arbitration by him is still possible.

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# BOOKS *and the* ARTS

## AN OPEN LETTER TO NEW YORK FILM CRITICS

BY LEO SAUVAGE

YOU will find me very ungrateful, Messieurs, and no doubt you would more readily forgive me if in the lines which follow I reproached you for a certain severity, even sometimes a little incomprehension, in regard to French films. This reproach, indeed, I shall make, apropos "The Raven" for example. But it seems to me more urgent to discuss with you first the excessive praise which you have given to some others of our films. The example I shall cite will certainly surprise you. You have been so unanimous in adoring "The Well-Digger's Daughter" that you will be scarcely able to believe that in France this film was quite generally detested.

It would be difficult to describe my stupefaction when in the editorial room of a Parisian daily I found on my desk a clipping announcing that "The Well-Digger's Daughter" had been named the best foreign film of the year by the New York critics. The announcement was an error, to be sure. Pagnol's film had not taken the prize; still it had had to bow only to one of the most powerful film works of these last years, Rossellini's "Open City." Aside from winning the prestige of second place, "The Well-Digger's Daughter" had also been included in the list of the ten best pictures in any language. The newspapers were carried away: "A revelation," wrote one—"reaches the pinnacle of French film-making." "A first-rate picture," declared another. "One of the better imports from France," proclaimed a third. "It is superb," said the fourth. And the fifth, in a lyrical flight, soared to the "golden age of French movies" along a triumphal way studded with adjectives like "cheerful," "inspiring," "thoughtful," "understanding," "human," "benign," "genial," "shrewd," "trenchant," "affectionate," "luminous."

Too much honor, Messieurs, too much honor! Certainly I understand—but only now that I am in New York—the reasons for this enthusiasm. I perceive at least three reasons, but only one among them—the acting of Raimu—could be common to Americans and Frenchmen. The other two—the local color and what one New York daily called the "treatment of certain sex unconventionalities"—seem plausible only in the United States. In France this film appears as extremely banal, a conventional accumulation of clichés, the commercial exploitation of all the common places frequented and hallowed for many generations.

Provence, with its blazing sun, its twisted olive trees, its white rocks, with its deeply rooted population and its singing accent—Provence is one of the most authentic regions of our "belle France." Marcel Pagnol was born at Aubagne, on the coast, and opened his eyes on the world at Marseilles. In his admirable trilogy, "Marius"-"Fanny"-"César," he was able to re-create, as no one else had done, the popular life of the great Mediterranean port. He could likewise give a savory and poetic reality to the Provençal village of "The Baker's Wife," that delicious cinematic tale which one among you, Messieurs—and this really passes belief—declared inferior to "The Well-Digger's Daughter." Actually "The Well-Digger's Daughter" is in the matter of local color no more than a shadow of "The Baker's Wife." To be sure, the sun is the same; it whitens the same rocks, parches the same olive trees. But in "The Well-Digger's Daughter," instead of illuminating the traditional life and the exceptional vagaries of a community, it serves only as an alibi for the pretensions of a psychologist, indeed of a moralist, Marcel Pagnol.

This "psychology" and this "morality," Messieurs, constitute in France the most perfect illustration of what we call the literature of the *kiosque de gare,* of the railroad-station newsstand. The character of the girl mother, which seems to you so revolutionary, has figured for dozens of years in France in the melodramas presented at carnivals and fairs and in the little books sold for twelve sous—today it is twenty-five francs—with which unscrupulous editors abuse the public intelligence. Also when I read in one of your papers that this film made one feel "happy and hopeful about a people who could do such a job," I caught only the word "job" as designating a means of making money by utilizing all the standing recipes without introducing the least bit of originality. Is this something to make one feel "happy and hopeful"?

When I say that Marcel Pagnol was interested only in a box-office success, I am not thinking merely of the fact that "The Well-Digger's Daughter" is to be found by the hundreds in France. Pagnol himself has repeated it three times. I do not know whether "Angèle" has been shown in the United States: it was the model of "The Well-Digger's Daughter," a model infinitely superior to the copy. Today, moreover, another film is on view in New York—"Naïs"—which apart from the fact that Fernandel has become a hunchback and that Charpin, instead of being the owner of a hardware store is a lawyer, is an exact carbon copy of "The Well-Digger's Daughter." As I write, I have not seen the reviews of "Naïs," but I am extremely curious, Messieurs, to learn your reactions. If you see in it another "pinnacle of French film-making," we shall no doubt soon have a fourth edition of the same film.

There was, to be sure, one originality in "The Well-Digger's Daughter," and only one. But this disappeared in the American copy. Produced under the Vichy regime, Pagnol's film not only appealed to the sentimentality of the spectators but servilely flattered the men in power. If the egotistical shopkeeper ended by opening his heart and his arms to love and its product, it was because he had just heard over the radio one of the tremulous sermons in which Mar-

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shal Pétain urged the unity of all Frenchmen. This sequence was cut in the American version. I am told that M. Pagnol considered replacing Pétain's sermon with an address by De Gaulle. By the way, such a thing would have been nothing new: Paul Claudel, who was once ambassador to Washington, after the liberation dedicated to De Gaulle an ode written under the occupation for Pétain. He simply had to delete the word *Maréchal* each time it occurred in his poem and substitute *Général,* which happily for the poet has the same number of syllables.

If Pagnol did not follow this example, it was, I suspect, not because the cynical impudence of such a procedure shocked him but because, as everyone knows, General de Gaulle was not very popular in the United States. You will tell me, Messieurs, that this little story is marginal to the film and that you could only judge the work that was presented to you without regard to its antecedents. But then, Messieurs, why did all your articles on "The Raven" begin with an occupation story which in the first place was not structurally part of the film—no collaborationist sequence was cut out of "The Raven" before it was shown in New York—and in the second place was absolutely false?

The calumnies which served as the pretext for the banning of the film in France are an old story today, and it has been proved not only that "The Raven" was not presented in Germany under the title "A Little French Town" —as many among you, Messieurs, felt bound to repeat—but that Clouzot's film was *never* presented in Germany, the Goebbels office having formally objected. The Goebbels office, in fact, saw in it something other than a genre picture susceptible of being exploited in favor of the Nazis, saw in it above all something which could be used against them —the revelation of what lies behind anonymous letter writing at a moment when much of the activity of the Gestapo in the occupied territories was based on denunciations made in anonymous letters.

I shall not say certainly that Clouzot, who is an artist indifferent to ideological considerations, shared this point of view. The campaign against "The Raven" was led by the Communists and the Catholics in a strange united front: the first for reasons of personal rivalry and also because, having attacked the film under the occupation, they could not retreat from their position; the second, more validly from their point of view, because the film is obviously not very Catholic. But since no one dared to deny the artistic qualities of the film, it seemed preferable to invent tactical lies. In France this campaign ended in the complete rout of its initiators. It is unfortunate that it has been taken up again—in good faith I am sure but with a regrettable lack of information—by a good proportion of the New York reviewers.

IT SEEMS evident to me that this error has falsified your judgments of "The Raven." Only thus can I explain the "faint shudder of distaste" felt by a critic whose journal, as a rule, does not take its directives from the Legion of Decency. For if "The Raven" is a "brilliant study in malevolence," we said the same thing in France about "La Vipère," ("The Little Foxes"). But far from seeing in it anything detrimental to the United States, we put Wyler's film to the credit of American film art—much more to its credit than films like "Gilda," of which Hollywood was so proud that it chose to be represented by this trifle at the first Cannes Festival. For my part I much prefer "La Vipère" to the same William Wyler's "The Best Years of Our Life," because I cannot help thinking that the latter's oh so good intentions ended by destroying its basic truth.

To show you what I mean, I mention a fact which I observed during a prolonged stay last year in Rome. Important personalities of the Italian political and film worlds were attacking Rossellini, Vittorio de Sica, and some others on the ground that films like "Open City," "Paisan," and "Shoeshine" gave foreign audiences an unfavorable idea of Italy. Yet in France these three films did more to increase friendship with Italy than thirty political discourses, and I am sure that in the United States also they have done much for the prestige of Italy. The unanimous praise given to these three films by American as well as French critics should be a useful counterbalance to the attacks at home: it is international support for national artistic values.

But as far as France is concerned, Messieurs, your severity toward Clouzot and your enthusiasm for Pagnol—I mean the Pagnol of "The Well-Digger's Daughter," for I too like the Pagnol of "Marius" and "The Baker's Wife"—your indulgence, in short, for many of our mediocre or sordid films, discourages our best producers and encourages the others. I was happy to read how much you liked "The Children of Paradise" and "Farrebique." I was a little surprised that you found the simple, sober, and discreet history of "Père Tranquille" ("Mr. Orchid") more improbable than we did ("rather unlikely" and even "a little dull"), but I was astounded, even more than by your response to "The Well-Digger's Daughter," by a publicity release about "Clandestine" which quoted one of you as saying that this low commercial exploitation of the blood of the Resistance, this unspeakable filth, "rivals 'Open City.' "

Since then I have read the article in its entirety and discovered that there had been some skilful juggling of its reservations for publicity purposes. Nevertheless, it does contain the statements that " 'Clandestine' has scenes of violence, courage, and danger which rival those in 'Open City,' " and that the film is "pretty good and 100 per cent European at its best." Another critic, whose articles I have followed with lively interest, finds that the film is "very, very good when it is good," and he regrets that its faults make one forget that "this is an uncommonly good French picture." Expressions of indignation—which would have been largely justified I believe—would have been much more beneficial to the French cinema as a whole than these reservations mingled with compliments, for in this case none of the excuses are valid which at a pinch could be offered for "The Well-Digger's Daughter."

And now I will conclude, Messieurs, by presenting you my compliments, undiminished by what I have said above, and asking you a question. Are you not eager, after reviewing "The Well-Digger's Daughter" and "Clandestine," to speak of a real picture, a great picture, one of the best ever produced in France? This film, which was directed by Claude Autant-Lara, is called "Le Diable au Corps." They say it has been banned in the United States. But I have read nothing from you about it.

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## The German Tragedy

*THE ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMANY.* By G. Barraclough. The Macmillan Company. $6.

*THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT.* By Karl Jaspers, The Dial Press. $2.

PROFESSOR BARRACLOUGH is Britain's outstanding authority on the history of Germany, particularly of medieval Germany. Karl Jaspers is a German philosopher who preserved his integrity in the Nazi period. The English historian is not primarily concerned with the question of German guilt. His history of Germany, beginning with the year 800, will have value for the English-speaking world far beyond the immediately relevant light it throws upon the question of German guilt. Yet the concluding chapters reveal Professor Barraclough's interest in the character of the Germany tragedy.

Here, then, are views of Germany from the outside and from the inside—one with a long and the other with a short historical perspective. The degree of agreement between the two books, so different in method and scope, restores one's confidence in the capacity of humane learning to rise above the passions and confusions of the hour. Professor Jaspers insists that Germans must recognize the difference between their explicit guilt for the evils of Nazism and the more negative guilt of other nations. He thinks this negative guilt primarily the result of the unwillingness of other nations to yield to a democratic Germany what they too readily yielded to the truculent Hitler. "What broke out in Germany," he declares, was under way in the entire Western world. "This does not diminish our guilt, for it was in Germany that the outbreak occurred—but it does free us from absolute isolation." Jaspers reminds us of complicities in Germany's guilt which we would undoubtedly like to forget. He speaks of the sympathy of the ruling classes of Europe for Hitler's cause, and even digs up a letter written by Churchill to Hitler and published in the *Times* in 1938. Churchill wrote, "Were England to suffer national disaster comparable to that of Germany in 1918, I should pray to God to send us a man of your strength of mind and will." How inconvenient history is when it reminds the righteous who have triumphed over the unrighteous of the ambiguity of their virtue in other days.

Barraclough defines the German problem as that "of a nation whose historical development has been retarded and arrested in two fundamental ways. Its progress toward national unity . . . was arrested until 1871. Its progress toward representative institutions was blocked until 1918; and even after 1918 such institutions were never safe against the machinations of the minority possessing social and economic power." Barraclough's excellent "long view" proves that one must go back to the Middle Ages and study Germany's relation to the Holy Roman Empire in order to understand why progress toward national integration was arrested. The long view also helps one to understand how a landed military caste was able to preserve its excessive authority, how the upper bourgeoisie became the tool and accomplice of this class, and why the genuine idealism in the bourgeois revolution, which in other countries helped to establish democracy, was dissipated in vain idealism in Germany. Barraclough's analysis of the lack of political realism in the idealists of both the revolution of 1848 and that of 1918 is very instructive. In each case nothing was done to change the essential power structure of the German state.

Barraclough's indictment of the traditional upper classes of Germany, who were "gentlemen" compared to the Nazi gunmen but whose historic guilt is unmistakable, is tremendously telling and ought to destroy any tendency to interpret the German tragedy in purely melodramatic terms, with the Nazis cast in the role of the gunmen who came from nowhere to overwhelm a decent civilization. In revealing the complicity of other European "gentlemen" in the machinations of these German gentlemen Barraclough proves much more effectively than Jaspers's brief words on the subject that an honest analysis of guilt reveals a whole series of concentric circles of guilt, with the criminal guilt of Nazism at the center. It is not merely the last circle but the second one from the center which includes a wider community than Germany.

Jaspers, incidentally, tries to define these circles of guilt more exactly. He defines the one at the center as "criminal guilt," expressed in "acts which violate unequivocal laws." His second circle is "political guilt," representing our responsibility by reason of our involvement "in the evil of a state of which we are citizens." The third circle is "moral guilt," in which we are involved by reason of the fact that we are never so unfree that we could not defy the order of even a tyrannical state. Jaspers has a strong and tragic feeling that every German who survived the Nazi tyranny is to some degree guilty in this way. He is careful to point out, however, that recriminations between the exiles who left Germany and those who fought Nazism at home, but without paying the ultimate penalty, are irrelevant.

Jasper's final circle is "metaphysical guilt," which he defines as guilt arising from the "solidarity among men as human beings which makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world." I would have some grave questions about this final category. If it is really metaphysical, that is, if it is given in the very character of reality, one might question whether any sense of responsibility could be implied for it. Perhaps the real situation is that if there is guilt at all it must be defined as moral guilt; but there are indeterminate concentric circles according to nearness or farness from the evil, freedom or necessity to participate in it, degrees of complicity in it—whether directly or indirectly, whether by acts of omission or commission. "Criminal" guilt would be the center of the circle. The term is unambiguous in law, where both the wrong act and the relation of the individual to it can be sharply defined. But criminal guilt also has some meaning in morals, in so far as it is possible in morals to define an explicit wrong and an explicit relation to it in terms of motive and intent.

After reading Barraclough's historical indictment of various classes in Europe, one feels that they were involved in more than "metaphysical guilt," for they did and left undone what contributed directly to the emergence of the Nazi evil. Some of the people, on the other hand, who were involved in "political guilt" with the Nazis by reason of belonging to the same nation with them were less responsible.

But though one may cavil at Jaspers's

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terminology, one must respect the profundity of his approach to the problem and his freedom from all evasions. He is concerned to give the German conscience no chance of denying special responsibilities for the Nazi evil, even while being forced, as any honest student would be, to point to the farther reaches of guilt beyond Germany. If Barraclough is more severe in his judgments upon the non-German world, and Jaspers more severe upon Germany, this contrast helps to prove the moral integrity of both.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

## Atomic Power Came Too Soon

*THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY*. By James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller. Whittlesey House. $5.

*ATOMIC ENERGY: ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS*. Royal Institute of International Affairs. $1.25.

IT IS a bit late to review these books. It was probably a bit late to write them. For on May 10, 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations called off its labors. And on the same day the President of the United States announced a highly successful test of greatly improved atomic bombs on Eniwetok atoll.

I suppose there is some point in noting—for the sake of some surviving academician—that the best scientific and political minds shortly after the Hiroshima explosion decided that it was technically feasible to control atomic energy and direct its use into beneficial channels. The survivor will no doubt thrill to the account by Messrs. Newman and Miller of how the civilians won a famous victory over the military in setting up a beautiful control system in the nation that had the original monopoly of the bomb. And he will not be able to resist the intellectual appeal of Britain's top scientists—nuclear and political—as they gathered week by week at their round table in Chatham House. It is good talk, good writing—and it touches all the problems that have been brought up at that hollow round table at Lake Success. Some of the Britons were full of hope; most of them were. But not Lord Hanky, who in the

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last paper in the collection remarks with gloomy prescience: "In the circumstances the wisest course would be to suspend the work on atomic-bomb control for a time in order to relieve the United Nations of this intractable question, and to give them time to build up solidarity and to establish confidence among the nations. For the present the question will be safer in the hands of the United States than of the United Nations."

And there the question rests at the moment—and probably will rest for some time. And we'll all be very lucky if the civilian victory written into the McMahon-Douglas act—the Newman-Miller book is an exhaustive analysis of the act—survives the "pressure of events and the temperature of opinion."

Some of the members of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission look back over two years of countless meetings and interminable discussions, add up the thousands of pages of verbatim and the dozens of reports, and say with a whistle through gritted teeth that the time was not wasted. "Some day," they say in the gathering gloom, "the world will want control. And then, by cricky, our plan is all ready." And they are probably right, as far as they go.

The main trouble is that atomic control has little to do with technical difficulties—although the technical nature of the process of producing nuclear fuel sets the pattern of the control system and makes the Russian suggestions for periodic inspection so much nonsense. Our main trouble is that our world is not rational enough for us to have atomic energy in our possession. We should have waited years, decades, perhaps centuries, before we devised the means of blowing ourselves up. National sovereignty is an irrational concept in the modern world—particularly in a world in which atomic energy is running around loose. Of course, the United States offered to surrender national sovereignty in proposing its scheme of control. But one sometimes wonders what would happen if the Russians really called the hand, really said: "All right, we've thought it all over again and we were wrong. We've got to have complete international operation, management, control of atomic energy. And we don't mind if you keep your bombs until the system is running. After that, of course, according to your own proposal, all bombs will be disposed of and strictly forbidden for any future use."

Of course, there is little danger of the United States being called. For national sovereignty is turning out to be a most useful shibboleth for the international Soviets as they guard the hearths and homes of the Eastern Europeans from Western exploitation. Moreover, if the Atomic Development Authority were established, that other modern irrationality, the Iron Curtain, would have to be atomized to allow atomic inspectors, managers, operators to get to the mines and installations in the Soviet Union. And the disappearance of the Iron Curtain would let in much more than U. N. technicians: it would let in a lot of light. And we have had no indication that this would suit the present masters of Soviet destiny.

But beyond the irrationalities at the national and political level there is the basic irrationality that expresses itself in the negativism of fear. Atomic control is a concept which for the most part has its roots in the fear of war and the fear of death. Not quite prepared to accept the supreme irrationality of burrowing underground and joining forces with the moles, man, still accepting the inevitability of war, plans for a reasonably safe war—a war no more dangerous than the last couple of wars carried on with "conventional armaments." Atomic energy, in the shape of atomic bombs, is the great threat: it must therefore be brought under control so that the average man won't have to die before his time or turn into a mole. This whole approach to the question, of course, is paralyzing and self-defeating. As long as we have wars atomic weapons will be used in wars—analogies of poison gas to the contrary notwithstanding.

The problem of atomic control, then, goes right to the root of the sicknesses and irrationalities of our world. (And I've no doubt it goes right down to the mental sicknesses of most of us who make up our world—page Dr. Brock Chisholm of W. H. O.) Until we have the basis of a fairly rational world community there's not much sense in talking about an international atomic control system. And when we do take more serious steps to create a mutually responsible world community—and a more generous use of the United Nations would help—then atomic control takes on an entirely new aspect. Atomic energy then ceases to be a symbol of death and becomes a symbol of life. The Atomic Development Authority becomes the agency to provide new sources of power, of healing, of scientific advance for man's good. In this context one of the best chapters in the Chatham House book is written by Sir Charles Webster, Sir Arthur Salter, and the new British ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks.

KING GORDON

## Communist Goings-on

*WORLD COMMUNISM TODAY*. By Martin Ebon. Whittlesey House. $3.50.

IN THIS 536-page survey of the "hidden ways" of the Communists the world over, Mr. Ebon supplies needed light to those innocents who still believe that the Stalinist outfit is a group of persecuted idealists who have established some sort of workers' republic in Russia and are now attempting, in the face of fierce capitalist opposition, to spread its manifest benefits to the workers of all the world, who have nothing to lose but their chains. It is too bad none of these innocents will read this well-documented book after they discover that its author is pretty hard-boiled about the "peculiar institution" which neo-communism has become. Of course, as is always the case in writing about Communists, who change their line more often than they change their shirts, some of Mr. Ebon's material is already "dated." But on the whole he furnishes a sorely needed background of Communist goings-on since the war and what seems from here to be a fairly accurate account of their present activities.

One might question his statement that "the Communist Party of the United States is the Communist Party par excellence." If that is indeed so, what are we worrying about? This reviewer has known and wrangled with many of the American Communists for, lo, these many years, and he has yet to meet one important figure in the party who has been allowed to stand on his own feet and make his own decisions. Call the roll from Gitlow and Lovestone to Budenz and Browder, and you'll see what

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I mean. When the apparatus of an organization calls for no more than robots for its tending, the organization fails to function, for, after all, it deals with human beings and not machine-tooled products. To be sure, the American Communists are now producing suspicion, fear, and hate in mass proportions, especially for the "liberal" market. But just what they gain is hard to see. Their membership is negligible, its turn-over is notoriously high, and their prestige among the workers as fighters for the under-dog is gone forever.

Though we may disagree with some of the author's opinions, when he gets down to reporting the everyday activities of party members the world over he does a workman-like job. In the campaigning days to come Republican and Democratic big mouths will be hollering about the Moscow "menace." They will go on identifying "commoonism"—as the ineffable J. Parnell Thomas after all his years of devoted un-American activities still calls it—with socialism, anarchism, nihilism, liberalism, and any other doctrine, capitalism always excepted, which threatens to upset what they like to call their minds. It does of course, savor of cruel and unusual punishment to ask any of them to read a book. However, Mr. Ebon's book rates a place on the shelves of anyone interested in knowing what means are employed by the Communists everywhere to achieve their professed ends.

MC ALISTER COLEMAN

## Music

B. H. HAGGIN

THE first pleasure of Ballet Theater's spring season at the Metropolitan Opera House was seeing ballet properly placed and framed once more—though the Metropolitan's technical inadequacies showed up in the poor lighting of the wonderful Berman fore-curtains and back-drops for "Giselle." A second pleasure was the revival of "Billy the Kid": Copland's finest score as lovely, Loring's imaginative choreography as fresh and touching, as ever (but the opening and closing processionals more questionable than ever); the performance newly perfected, with Kriza an even stronger Billy than Loring but not as amusing in the first scene, and Alicia Alonso exquisite in the waltz.

That brings me to the next pleasure: Alonso's dancing. Edwin Denby once wrote that "in all the severity of exact classicism Danilova's dancing rhythm fills the time quantities of the music to the full; it does not, like the rhythm of lesser dancers, jab at a stress and then leave a gap till the music catches up." As late as a year ago I was criticizing just such jabbing by Alonso; but in these recent performances she filled out the time quantities with a continuous flow of movement of the utmost elegance. This elegance in quietly secure and superbly assured brilliance of both Alonso and Youskevitch was a delight in their "Black Swan" *pas de deux* and in Balanchine's "Theme and Variations."

But the season didn't provide only pleasures. For one thing—as against Alonso's quiet and elegance in "Swan Lake"—there was Gollner's violently hammed-up performance. For another there were the two ballets: first, Tudor's "Shadow of the Wind," its astonishingly feeble and padded choreography as unrelated to the music and words of Mahler's "Lied von der Erde" ("Er stieg vom Pferd herab," sang the contralto mournfully while Gollner and Bentley rose and whipped themselves around on one point) as the drably "modern" movements of Tudor's "Dark Elegies" were to the music and words of Mahler's "Kindertotenlieder." Then Agnes de Mille's "Fall River Legend," more completely derived from Tudor's "Pillar of Fire" than her "Rodeo" was from Loring's "Billy the Kid"—which is to say, with almost nothing this time of her own style that made "Rodeo" a real creation even with its borrowings—and Morton Gould's serious dramatic music sounding even more pretentious and empty than his smart-Alec humorous stuff.

Also—as against the well-rehearsed, accurate performances of these and other works of Tudor and De Mille and of "Billy the Kid"—there was the increased dilapidation of Balanchine's "Apollo." The piece is so infrequently performed—to say nothing of rehearsed—that the first time Youskevitch forgot the gestures with which Apollo parts Terpsichore from the other muses in their first dance together, and merely stood watching interestedly as they parted by themselves; the second time he forgot to place his knees for Alonso to sit down on; both times his performance throughout was something only approximately remembered and unprecisely timed, with occasional filling in of his


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
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own or mere waiting out where he had forgotten entirely; and both times the sequence of leg gestures by the three muses at their first entrance was spoiled by incorrect timing. Even the blacking out of the first scene for Youskevitch to run off stage and change his costume was again, as at City Center last year, forgotten—from which you can get an idea of the complete lack of care with which the piece is kicked on to the stage when it *is* given. A representative of the company explained that Balanchine had been asked to rehearse the work but had been too busy with Ballet Society; but Balanchine informed me that he had been offered one hour for what needed several days.

The company's representative also explained the cancelation of Balanchine's "Six Waltzes" (formerly "Waltz Academy") by Alonso's inability to add to her heavy burden of rehearsal. But Balanchine worked several days last fall to bring the work to the point where it could be finished and performed in Chicago; and evidently it was not finished and performed. What all this reveals is an attitude toward a great artist's work with which Tudor, the company's artistic director, and Lucia Chase and Oliver Smith, its administrative directors, do themselves grave discredit.

Nor are they the only ones. Last fall I wrote Max Goberman, the company's excellent conductor, that he had taken the music of "Apollo" faster than Balanchine had done in the rehearsals, and too fast, sometimes, for the dancers to get all the movements into the passage of music. At the first performance this time Goberman rushed through the piece again; at the second he had proof of my contention in the slower pace at which Stravinsky himself conducted it with superb effect. For that matter Goberman could learn something from Balanchine's unhurried and beautifully clarifying conducting of "Theme and Variations."

## *CONTRIBUTORS*

LEO SAUVAGE is spending a year in this country as correspondent of the French daily *Le Populaire*. He was formerly the film critic of *Franc-Tireur*.

MCALISTER COLEMAN, a left-wing journalist, is the author of "Men and Coal."

# LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

## Help for Viet Nam

*Dear Sirs:* The French war against the Republic of Viet Nam is still going on. The Viet Namese are fighting with a sense of lonely isolation from the world. We believe they should be encouraged to resist the imposition of native totalitarianism, of the Communist variety or otherwise, as well as the restoration of French colonial rule. It is a matter of utmost importance for now and for the future that the Viet Namese should know that many Americans are their friends.

We have undertaken to raise a fund of $25,000 to purchase vitally needed drugs and other medical items. We have formed this committee under the auspices of the Viet Nam American Friendship Association. We ask your readers to make themselves responsible for a minimum contribution from themselves and their friends. This is a way of making the best kind of American influence felt where, until now, it has been so sadly lacking. Our address is 796 Ninth Avenue.

ROBERT DELSON, VIRGINIA T. ADLOFF, JAMES T. FARRELL, HAROLD R. ISAACS, JAMES H. W. THOMPSON, CLARA CLAYMAN, PEARL S. BUCK, J. J. SINGH, RICHARD J. WALSH, ROGER BALDWIN, JOHN HAYNES HOLMES, NORMAN THOMAS.

New York, June 23

## The Passing of the Lincoln School

*Dear Sirs:* On Friday, May 28, I attended the graduation exercises of the Horace Mann-Lincoln School. The scene has been repeated in a thousand places all over the United States in recent weeks, but nowhere has it had the significance of the exercises at Lincoln, which were taking place in a setting of sorrow, even of tragedy, for the school we knew has closed its doors and will be no more.

When the Lincoln School was founded in 1917, it represented the vision of two great educators, Dr. Abraham Flexner and Dr. Charles W. Eliot, who sensed the need of a good experimental school. They enlisted the support of the Rockefeller family, which through the General Education Board set up an endowment fund of $30,000,000 for the *permanent* continuation of experimental education, and then supplied a modern school building at a cost of around $1,500,000. The idea, the fund, and the building were handed over to the trustees of Teachers College for administration. The school flourished, owing to the enthusiasm of its teachers and the joy of learning they passed on to their pupils. During these early happy years T. C. appeared to cooperate enthusiastically with the great adventure.

Even before T. C. itself, the Horace Mann School had been established, an excellent school organized originally along classical lines. After T. C. was founded, the Horace Mann School became a demonstration school for the pedagogic researches and principles developed at the college. But this, unfortunately, proved expensive, and deficits accumulated. Horace Mann, alas, had no endowment fund upon which to draw.

Administrators of an institution of learning are always in risk of losing their vision as educators and becoming accountants, an honorable profession, but quite different from that of education. A new dean took office at Teachers College. Except for a few outstanding professors, T. C. no longer maintained a warm enthusiasm for the ideas and aims of the Lincoln School. It has been said that in the twenty years of its existence the younger Dean Russell never set foot in the Lincoln School building. There developed, however, a much warmer interest in the $3,000,000.

And so one day in 1940 the parents of children at the Lincoln School were called together and informed that it was financially necessary to merge Lincoln with Horace Mann. When the parents violently objected, and proved that insupportable conclusions had been drawn from the figures submitted by T. C., it suddenly developed that there really was no financial reason for the merger. The reason became an educational one: Horace Mann, it seems, was adopting all the excellent progressive ideas of Lincoln, while Lincoln now wasn't doing much experimenting and was just a good progressive school like Horace Mann. So the schools should be merged. The parents at both schools said No, and went to court to prevent it. But they lost the case when T. C. contended that the new merged school would be an even better experimental school than Lincoln, and that such a school would continue to be run under the terms of the Rockefeller endowment. The schools

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were merged, the accumulated deficit of Horace Mann vanished, and there were no further deficits.

The old Horace Mann building suddenly took on a new look. Badly needed repairs were made, new floors laid down. Not much was undertaken on experimental lines, but the children seemed happy, the parents saddened but resigned. Then, after the merged school had had only three years of life, it was announced by T. C. that Horace Mann-Lincoln would be closed at the end of the school year of 1947.

The parents joined together again to prevent this new development. They fought hard in the courts, but the documents establishing the Lincoln School endowment had been drawn loosely, apparently in the belief that in dealing with great ideas and moral relationships it would not be necessary to dot every "i" and cross every "t." After a long and bitter legal battle, the last appeal was turned down in May by the New York State Court of Appeals.

Perhaps the Provost and Dean of Teachers College will now be able to merge the accumulated deficits of Teachers College with the endowment fund. Perhaps T. C. is in tune with the present era, in which training for leadership is abhorred. The entire progressive-education movement is suspect, of course, in these days of the narrowing of minds, and for the past ten years T. C. has not had its heart in the movement. But progressive education cannot die as long as teachers like Helen F. Darringer, Gordon R. Mirick, B. J. R. Stolper, Frances Sweeny, Rebecca J. Coffin, Anne T. Eaton, Alice Stewart, Josephine Mayer, and Hélène Célières, to name a few, live.

Efforts are under way to make the school live again. Next September, in space generously provided by the 110th Street Community Center, a new school following the traditions of Lincoln-Horace Mann will be opened. It will incorporate much of the present student body and many of the faculty members of Lincoln-Horace Mann. Unfortunately, it will not—yet—be endowed like Lincoln. For that reason, those who remember the Lincoln School that was, and who wish to see it rise again, may want to participate in the new adventure. They can address contributions or requests for further information to Mrs. Myron S. Falk, Jr., The Experimental School, Inc., 31 West 110th Street, New York City.

BENJAMIN HARROW

New York, June 25

# Crossword Puzzle No. 270

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



## ACROSS

1 The cry of the Silver parrot. (6, 2, 5)
10 For sale. (5)
11 Hand reins for the Supreme Council. (9)
12 They're not first-class any longer. (9)
13 Soak in a bath to go and dance. (5)
14 When it comes to letters, "Y" is. (6, 2, 4)
19 Second-hand, or just prejudiced? (12)
22. Kind of wild rose. (5)
24 Boat-race, or only in confidence. (5, 4)
25 Angostura in a mixture for the 49'ers. (9)
26 How Diana was changed into a nymph. (5)
27 Revival. (13)

## DOWN

2 Don't concern yourself with this region. (6)
3 Piatagorsky alone. (5, 4)
4 In a boat, as far as you'll have such a bark. (9)
5 The end of sin if it doesn't come down. (5)
6 Intermixed? (5)
7 There's a rabbit around when a confused gnu makes a speech! (8)
8 You'll be put out if people do it to you. (5)
9 Some words show a meaning, but not many the opposite. (7)
15 Amazon armies? (9)
16 What writers and knights have to do when struck? (9)
17 It's a kind of illusion that the Capitol has been moved. (7)
18 On top, and yet gets soundly whipped. (8)
20 I got after a man, but not direct to the bottom. (6)
21 How Mr. Lapidus (the salesman) makes his way? (5)
23 Let your this be the judge. (5)
24 Noise of the stable. (5)

### SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 269

ACROSS:—1 COME AND TRIP IT AS YOU GO ON THE LIGHT FANTASTIC TOE; 5 SCHOLIA; 9 ARROYOS; 10 FOREVER; 11 POILU; 12 AMARYLLIS; 14 ROSE; 15 DEFLATE; 18 ART; 20 SOD; 21 GEHENNA; 26 EGLANTINE; 29 INGENUE; 30 RETYPED; 31 GETS SET; 32 RECITAL.
DOWN:—1 CHAMPS; 2 MARTIN; 4 DISEASE; 5 and 23 across SAFE AND SANE; 6 HARRY; 7 and 28 LOVELY AS A TREE; 8 ARRESTED; 13 ORE; 18 AGREEING; 22 AILMENT; 23 SHEARER; 25 MENDEL; 27 NONES.

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